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EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
Youri Devuyst
ABSTRACT
As the world's largest trading block, the European Union (EU) has conmitted itself
to an ambitious strategy of enhancing trade with its strategic partners through the conclusion
of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The launching of negotiations between the EU and the
United States for the conclusion of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
Agreement is part of this strategy. Understanding the EU's law and practice in the negotiation
and conclusion of such agreements is essential for the Union's negotiating partners, who have
often been puzzled by its decision-making complexity. Following a systematic presentation of
the EU's institutions and their legal functions in the making of trade agreements, this Article
provides an in-depth and step-by-step analysis of the EU's inter-institutional and legal
practice in the negotiation and conclusion of international trade agreements. As such, this
Article also constitutes a thorough assessment of the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon
in the trade policy field. After almost three years of practice, it can be concluded that the
enhanced role of the European Parliament in the making of trade agreements is the Lisbon
Treaty's most important change in this area. Far from being the disruptive element that a
number of prominent legal scholars had predicted. Parliament has not only brought a much
needed element of democratization and open political debate in EU trade policy making, it
has also delivered proof of its added value, notably by reinforcing the preservation of
fundamental rights. The next step should be for Parliament to gain a formal role in the
determination of the EU's negotiating directives.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

This article assesses the law and practice of the European Union (EU)'s decisionmaking in the negotiation and conclusion of international trade agreements. The subject is
particularly relevant. First, the EU has remained the world's most important trading bloc, in
spite of the current crisis in the Euro Area and the emergence of new economic powerhouses
such as China, India and Brazil. ' With an internal market of more than 500 million inhabitants
and a combined GDP of C12,268,387 million in 2010, the EU continues to be the world's first
exporter and first importer, both in goods and commercial services. 2 Its market power alone
justifies that the EU's mechanism of making international trade law and policy is well
understood.
Second, in contrast with the troubled governance of the Euro Area, the EU's
decision-making process in the field of international trade policy is an example of the
supranational Community method, whereby the Member States have effectively handed over
competences and policy instruments from the national to the EU level and whereby the EU
consequently speaks with a single voice. 3 As Oxford University Professor Timothy Garton
Ash has recently concluded, while Chinese policynakers may treat the EU with something
close to contempt in geopolitical affairs, a "trade negotiation between China and the EU is a
conversation between equals" because it is an area "where the EU really does act as one."' It
is worth taking a closer look at the institutional system that has provided the EU with such a
powerful voice in international conmercial diplomacy, and also because it serves as a model
for other regional trade blocs. 5

1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
The
Etropean
Union
Trade
Policy
2013,
at
6,
http. trade.ec.europa.eu'doclib/docs/2011 ,august/tradoc 148181 .pdf.
2 The Economy, EUROPAEu, http:/ieuropa.eu/about-eu/facts-figui-esieconomy/index en.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2013); Living in the EU, EUROPAEU, http:Heu-opa.eu/about-eu/facts-figul-esiliving/index en.htm (last
visited Feb. 26, 2013); WORLD TRADE ORS.[hereinafter WTO], WORLD TIRADE REPORT 2012 23 (2012). The
EU represents 14.9% of the world's total exports in goods, 24.8% of exports in services, 16.2% of imports in
goods and 21.1% of imports in services for the year 2011.
See Youri Devuyst, The European Union's InstitutionalBalance After the Treaiy QfLisbon: "Conniunay
Method" and "Denocratic Deficit" Reassessed, 39 GEO. J. LT'L L 247, 250-53 (2008); Renaud Dehousse,
The

Conmunin 11ethod' at Sixty, in THE 'COMMUNITY METHOD': OBSTINATE OR OBSOLETE? 3 (Renaud

Dehousse, ed.,
2011) (describing the rationale and essence of the Community Method).
4 Timothy Garton Ash, Can Europe Survive the Rise of' the Rest?, N.Y.

TIMES (Sept.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/0902/opinioii/sunday/can-europe-survive-the-rise-of-the-rest.html'?

1, 2012),

r-O.

5 Tobias Lenz, Spurred Enmulation: The EU and Regional Integration in Aercosur and S.ADC, 35 W. EUR.
POE. 155 (2012). See Finn Laursen, Cornparative Regional Integrationand the E U Model How to Achieve
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Third, the Conmmnity method is dynamic in the sense that it evolves over time as
part of the constantly changing construction of Europe.6 Trade policy has been part of this
process of change, with an emphasis on the search for greater efficiency and more
democracy. As said by then-EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy during the European
Constitutional Convention of 2002-2003, the EU's trade policy mechanism is "un exemple ti
parfaire" (an example to improve).8 The most recent changes to the EU's procedures for
making trade policy and international agreements
partly resulting from Connissioner
Lamy's appeal - were introduced with the entr, into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on
December 1, 2009. 9 After almost three years of practice, it is time to make an assessment of
the impact of these Lisbon Treaty adaptations.
Fourth, the EU is making a very active use of its new trade policy provisions and
has committed itself to an ambitious strategy of enhancing trade with its strategic partners
through the conclusion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 10 Thus, in February 2013, the EU
and the United States agreed to take their economic relationship to a higher level by launching
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement." At the same
time, the EU and Japan have also decided to launch bilateral FTA negotiations in the course
of2013.12 These are only the latest in an impressive series of FTA projects initiated by the EU
in recent years. In 2010, the EU signed a FTA with the Republic of Korea that is going
substantially beyond the mere elimination of tariffs on goods and restrictions on the provision
of services, and includes detailed sections on the regulator, environment of the parties such as
sector-specific non-tariff barriers, intellectual property protection. competition rules, and

Credible Conmtinents (NAFTA and MERCOSUR), in THE STATE OF
COMPAALTIVE REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE EU MODEL 161

THE UNION(S): THE EUROZONE CRISIS,

(Joaquin Roy ed., 2012) (explaining

the EU
as a model for other regional integration agreements). See gneraly COMPARATIVE REGIONAL INTEGRATION:

EUROPE AND BEYOND (Finn Laursen ed., 20 10).
6 Youri Devuyst, The Co
:,uniy-Mlethod after A, sterda 37 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 109, 110 (1999).
7 See generally Rafael Leal-Arcas, Is EC Trade Polic© I1p to Par?: A Legal Analysis over Time Rome.
Marrakesh,Amsterdam. XVce. and the ConstitutionalTreai, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 305 (2007) (providing an
in-depth survey of the evolution in the EU's Treaty law on trade policy).
Pascal Lamy, La politique commerciale et la Convention: un exemple Aparfaire (Oct. 15, 2002).
The Treaty at a Glance, EUROPA.EU, ittp:europa.eu/lisbon treaty/glance/index en htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2013); Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) I. See also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU]; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]; PAUL CRAIG, THE
LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM 388-91, 396-402 (2010); JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE
LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 280-86 (2010) (for insightful overviews of the Lisbon

Treaty changes on EU trade policy).
10 European Council, Conclusions
4, Brussels (Sept. 16, 2010 EUCO 21/l/10), ai'liale at
http:Hwww.consilium.europa.eu/uedocsicmsdata'docs/pressdata/en/ec 116547.pdf European Commission,
Trade. Growth and WorldAjhirs: Trade Policy As a Core Component of the EU s 2020 Slrateg, at 9-10 COM
(2010) 612 final (Nov. 9. 2010), available at http:i/trade.ec.europa.euidoclib docsi2010/november
itradoc 146955.pdt

" Statement from United States President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy
and European Comm'n President Jose Manuel BalToso (Feb. 13, 2013), available at http:/xww.whitehouse
.govithe-piess-office/2013/02/13istatement-united-states-piresident-barack-obama-european-council-presiden.
12 Memorandum, European Commission, The EU's free trade agreements
where are we? Brussels, I (Mar.
25, 2013) [hereinafter Overview of FTA Negotiations], available at http:i/trade.ec.europa.euidoclib/docs/201

2/november/tradoc 150129.pdf.
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government procurement. In 2012, the EU signed FTAs with Central America (as a region),
as well as with Columbia and Peru (as a multipart agreement)." Also in 2012, it completed
the technical stage of deep and comprehensive FTA negotiations with Singapore and
Uka-ame.1 - In addition, the EU is currently in the process of negotiating FTAs with a host of
other trading partners, 16including Canada, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Mercosur, Georgia,
Armenia and Moldova.
Fifth, while a solid understanding of the EU's decision-making mechanisms is
important. particularly for the Union's negotiating partners. they have often been puzzled by
its complexity.1 More than a decade ago, Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, then President
Bill Clinton's Trade Representative, characterized the EU's trade policy regime as "an opaque
system" involving "unclear lines of authority between the Commission and the Member
States. 18 President Barack Obama expressed himself in a more diplomatic language, joking
that he had "gotten a crash course in European politics over the last several days," after the G20 meeting of November 2011 in Cannes, France, where the EU and its Euro Area crisis had
been a central issue. 19 Summarizing his newly gained insights in the EU's decision-making
processes. he underlined "the fact that you're negotiating with multiple parliaments, a
European Parliament. a European Conmnuission I mean, there are just a lot of institutions
here in Europe ... And there are a lot of meetings here in Europe as well. So trying to
coordinate all those different interests is laborious, it's time consuming." Even experienced
American lawyers based in Brussels depict EU decision-making as "complex machinery that
is often confusing even for the initiated and still more puzzling to an outside observer
accustomed to the U.S. model of federalism. 1
Against this background, and particularly in light of the EU's current offensive in
the negotiation of bilateral FTAs with its most important strategic partners, it is essential to
clarify the legal and institutional aspects of the making of international trade agreements by
the EU. Understanding EU trade policy in its various components first of all requires a brief

13 Council Decision 2011/265, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 1, 6 (EU) [hereinafter Council Decision 2011 /265/EU]. See
also Colin M. Brown, The European Union and Regional Trade Agreements: A Case Study of the EU-Korea
FTA, 2 EUR. YB. INT'L ECON. L. 297, 307 (2011); Chang-Sang Cho, Korea-EU FTA: a BlueprintJ br Coprosperity, in EU-KOREA RELATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD H, 35 (Axel Marx et al. eds., 2013); Der-Chin
Horng, Reshaping the EUs FTA Policy in a Globalizing Econon v: the Case of the EU-Korea FTA, 46 J.
WORLD TRADE 301, 326 (2012). These three sources underline the broad scope of the EU-Korea FTA and label
it "an important precedent," "a historic monument," and "a benchmark tor a series of new FTA negotiations
with other key trading partners," respectively.
"4 Overview of FTA Negotiations, supra note 12, at 3.
15 id.

Id. at 2.
TONY BLAIR, AJOURNEY 551 (2010) (revealing the astonishment of President George W. Bush's finding of
a Belgian at the G-8 table as President of the European Council).
" Charlene Barshefsky, Rcfletions a
ton
f Transition: The TransatlanticRelationship and its Future.
Speech it the European-Anericn Busiess Coun(ci (Jan. 17, 2001 ).
"9 Press Conference by President Obama After G20 Summit,

HE W1HLE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC.
(Nov. 4, 2011), available at http:/,,www.wvhitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/04/press-conferencepresident-obama-after-g20-summit.
20 id.

2 Roger Martella & Glory Francke, Federa/ism in European Environmental Decision Mcking, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVT' 1 (2012), avaabic at http://,'www.americanbar.org/content'dam/aba/publications

/natural resources environnent/sumnmer2012/nre sunl2 martella francke.authcheckdam.pdf.
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introduction into its legal nature and into the division of trade competences between the EU
and its Member States. This is the focus of Section I.Section III is devoted to a presentation
of the EU's institutions, with an emphasis on their legal functions in the making of
international trade agreenents. This opens the way for an in-depth and step-by-step analysis
in Section IV
of the EU's inter-institutional and legal practice in the negotiation and
conclusion of international trade agreements. As such, this Article also constitutes a thorough
assessment of the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon in the trade policy field. Based on
the assessment of the legal practice. Section V formulates a number of recommendations
in
light of the need for decision-making efficiency and democratic accountability - with respect
to the two major changes resulting from the Lisbon Treaty for the EU's trade policy
fornulation: the rise of the European Council and the enhanced position of the European
Parliament. The conclusion, reforlnulated in Section VI, underlines that Parliament has not
only brought a much needed element of democratization and open political debate in EU trade
policy making, but has also delivered ample proof of its added value, notably by reinforcing
the preservation of fundamental rights during the negotiations. The next step should be for
Parliament to gain a forlnal role in the determination of the EU's negotiating directives.
I1.
A.

THE EU'S COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY

The Existence of an EU Competence in International Trade
22

The EU's competences are governed by the principle of conferral, " which means
that the EU shall only act within the limits of the competences conferred or attributed to it by
the Member States in the Treaties on which the EU isfounded. 23 The first question is
therefore that of the existence of a EU competence in external trade questions. In other words,
it should be established whether the EU Treaties have conferred any powers on the Union in
this area. This is the case. 4 The EU's primary law leaves no doubt that the EU shall have an
external trade policy formally called the Common Conmercial Policy (CCP) that shall
contribute "to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of
restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of
customs and other barriers .
B.

The Nature of the EU's Competence in International Trade

Next, it is important to determine the nature of the EU's CCP competence. The
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU makes a distinction between three broad categories of
Union competence: those exclusively attributed to the EU, those shared between the EU and
its Member States, and those where the EU's role is limited to supporting, coordinating or
supplementing the actions of the Member States. 26 The CCP is explicitly listed as one of the

22 TEU art. 5(1).
23Id. art.
5(2);
Opinion 2/00, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9713, para. 5.
24TIEU arts. 3(1), 206-207..
TFEU
E5 art. 206..
21Id.art. 2.
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EU's exclusive competences. This means that only the Union may legislate and adopt
legally binding acts in that area .28 The Member States are able to act only if so empowered
by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts. 2'
That the CCP was included in the Lisbon Treaty's list of exclusive EU comipetences
did not come as a surprise. Already in 1975, the European Court of Justice had held that the
CCP was an exclusive competence of the European Economic Community (EEC) the EU's
predecessor.3 ° In Opinion 1/75, the Court underlined that the CCP was conceived "for the
defence of the conmon interests of the Conmunity," and stated that the exercise of
concurrent powers by the Member States and the Conmunity in this field was "impossible":
To accept that the contrary were true would amount to recognizing that, in
relations with third countries, Member States may adopt positions which
differ from those which the Community intends to adopt, and would
thereby distort the institutional framework, call into question the mutual
trust within the Community and prevent
the latter from fulfilling its task in
3
the defence of the common interest. 1
The exclusive nature of the CCP is the logical corollary of the customs union that
was set up by the Treaty of Rome of 1957 establishing the EEC. 32 As prescribed by Article
XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), customs unions have an
internal and an external characteristic. 33 Internally, customs unions eliminate the duties and
other restrictive regulations of commerce with respect to substantially all trade between the
constituent territories of the union. 34 Externally, in relations with third countries, customs
unions apply substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce. 35 In the EU,
these criteria have been interpreted strictly. This means that in trade between the EU Member
States, customs duties on imports and exports, and charges having equivalent effect, are
prohibited. 36 For imports from third countries, the EU has a Common Customs Tariff
(CCT). 37 Individual Member States have lost the competence to levy their own customs
duties on products that are imported from outside the EU. 3 8 For such products from third
countries, only the CCT applies. It is fixed by the EU's Council of Ministers, on a proposal

27 Id. art. 3(1)(e).
21

Id. art. 2(2).

29 id.

30 Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, 1365.
Id. at 1363-1364.
2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 9, signed Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]; TFEU art. 206.
3' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXW, opened for signtaure Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, at
A5, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1952) [hereinafter GATT 1947]; See generally Youri Devuyst & Asia Serdarevic, The
World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements: Brdging the ConstitutionalCredibili Gap, 18
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (2007) (providing a detailed analysis of the provisions of GATT art. XXWV).
34 GATT 1947, supra note 33, art. XXIV, T (8)(a)(i).
3Id. jt (8)(a)(ii).

TFEU art. 30.
Id. art. 31.
3' Id. arts. 2 3 31.
7
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of the European Commission. In addition to the CCT,customs unions also apply the same
other 41
regulations of comimerce to third countries.
In the EU, the latter has given rise to the
CCP.

C.

The Scope of the EU's Competence in International Trade

The fact that the CCP belongs to the EU's exclusive competences does not say
anything about its scope, i.e. about the range of subjects that fall within the CCP concept. But
precisely because the Treaties attribute such strong powers to the EU in CCP matters, its
scope has been the subject of a decades-long legal and political debate .42
International trade
agreements that come entirely under the CCP can be concluded following a relatively
straightforward procedure: on a proposal of the European Commission, the Council of
Ministers takes the decision, generally
by qualified majority voting, and after obtaining the
S
43
consent of the European Parliament. However, trade deals that come partly under the CCP,
but partly remain within the competence of the Member States, are so-called mixed
agreements that require the green light of each Member State separately in addition to EUlevel approval. 44 The ratification of an agreement by all EU Member States, in addition to its
conclusion by the EU, is a cumbersome process that creates multiple legal problems. At this

Id. art.
31.
40 GATT 1947, supra note 33, art XXIV, 1 (8)(a)(ii).
4 TFEU arts.
3,207.
12The author has discussed this legal debate at length in another article. See You'i Devuyst, The European
Union's Competence inInternational Trade Afer the Trea4, o Lisbon, 39 GA.J.INT'L & COmP.L. 640, 647660 (2011). See also Marise Cremona, External Relations and External Competence of the European Union:
the Emergence of an ntegrated Policy, inTHE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 217 at 226-232 (Paul Craig & Grainne
de Burca eds., 2d ed. 2011); PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTER ,'ALRELATIONS LAW 11-69 (2d ed. 2011); Inge
Govaere Extnial Competence: ffWhat"
In aNamne? lihe Diffiicult Conciliation betwveen yanism of the ECJ
and Dynmic+"of European Integration, in 30 YEARS OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES AT THE COLLEGE OF

EUROPE 461 (Paul Demaret et al.eds., 2005) (for extensive surveys of the historical evolution of the CCP's
scope).
3 TFEU art. 218(6). The various components of this decision-making process are the subject of Section RW in
the present article.
44The practice that mixed trade agreements "shall be concluded jointly by the Community and the Member
States" was explicitly added by the Treaty of Nice. See Consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the
Eropean Community, 2006 O.J. (C 321) [hereinafter TEC after Nice], art. 133(6). This provision is no longer
present in the currently applicable TIFEU art. 207. In the words of the European Court of Justice, the common
action that is required of the EU and its Member States by virtue of their shared competence in the signing and
conclusion of mixed agreement allows the interest of the EU in establishing a comprehensive, coherent and
efficient external conmercial policy to be pursued xhilst at the same time allowing the special interests Xhich
the Member States might wish to defend in the sensitive areas under national competence to be taken into
account. According to the Court, the obligation of close cooperation between the Member States and the EU
institutions in the process of negotiation and conclusion of such mixed agreements flows from the requirement
of unity in the EU's international representation; Opinion 1/08, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11129, 136.
15 See generai,

MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD

(Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) (providing an up-to-date overview of legal questions related
to EU mixed agreements); MIXED AGREEMENTS (David O'Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1983) (the

landmark study that raised academic attention to the topic of EU mixed agreements in 1983); LA
COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES: QUELLES PERSPECTIVES? (Jacques H.J. Bourgeois et
al eds., 1997) (providing interesting perspectives by practitioners and academics).
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moment, around three years typically pass between the signature and the ratification of mixed
agreements by the EU and its Member States.16 Logically, the European Corntission the
EU institution charged with promoting the general interest of the EU has argued over the
years for a broad interpretation of the CCP in order to avoid the complexity of mixed
agreements. while the Member States, together with the EU's Council of Ministers, have
often insisted on remaining directly involved in the conclusion of international trade
agreements.'
The Treaty of Lisbon finally resolved much of the confusion on the scope of the
CCP by fully integrating trade in services, conmmercial aspects of intellectual property and
foreign direct investment into the CCP. 4' These had been the sub-sectors causing much of the
disputes around the precise range of the CCP. 49 In the currently applicable Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU, the scope of the CCP is defined in the following terms:
The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles,
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff
and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the
commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and
measures to protect trade such as those taken in the event of dumping or
subsidies. 5°
While some important legal questions remain, especially on the precise scope of foreign
direct investment (FDI), the Treaty of Lisbon constitutes a major breakthrough.

"

Frank Hoffineister, Curse or Blessing? Mixed Agreements in the Recent Practice of the European Union

and Its Member States, in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra note 45, at 249, 256.
47

See generally SOPHIE MEUNIER,

TRADLNG

VOICES:

THE

EUROPEAN

UNION

LN INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCLAL NEGOTLATIONS (2005); Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicoldidis, The European Union as a
Conflicted Trade Power, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 906 (2006); Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, The
European Union As a Trade Power, im INTER-NATIONAL R-ELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 247

(Christopher Hill & Michael Smith eds., 2005) (providing a detailed surveys of EU decision-making in trade
policy, the resistance of the Member States to expand the scope of the CCP and the practical consequences of
mixity).
4' TIEU art. 207(1).
"' Marc Bungenberg, Going Global" The EU Conmnon Conmnercial Policy After Lisbon, I EUR. Y.B. INT'L
ECON. L. 123 (2010); EECKHOUI' supra note 42, at 57-67; Markus Krajewski, The Reform of the Comon
Commercial Policy: Coherent and Democratic?, in EU LAW AFTER LISBON 292 (Andrea Biondi et al. eds.,

2012); Gonzalo Villalta Puig & Bader A1-Haddab, The Common ConmnercialPolicy qtierLisbon: An Analyis
of the Reforms, 36 EUI. L. REV. 289, 291-296 (2011).
TFEU art. 207(1).
Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Cornpetences Between the EU and Its Menber States in the Area of
Investnent Politics, EUR. Y.B. INT'L ECON. L. 29 (2011); Pieter-Jan Kuijper, Foreign Direct Investment: The
First Test of the Lisbon Inprovements in the Domain of Trade Policy, 37 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION
261 (2010); Federico Ortino & Piet Eeckhout, Towards an EU Policy on Foreign Direct Investnen, in EU
LAW AFTER LISBON, supra note 49, at 312.
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IlI. THE EU'S INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
This section introduces the EU's institutional framework, with specific reference to
the making of international trade agreements. As said at the start of this article, the CCP is an
example of the Community method. In other words, EU trade policy works by maintaining a
balance in the process of negotiating and concluding international agreements between those
institutions representing the interests of the Member States (European Council and Council of
Ministers) and those representing the supranational interests of the Union as a whole
(European Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice). 53 The
following sections will briefly introduce each of these institutional actors.
A.

The European Council
1. Composition and Organization

The European Council is the meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the
EU's Member States (i.e. the highest political leaders of the Member States with
responsibility for EU affairs, such as the French President, the German Chancellor and the
British Prime Minister), together with its President and the President of the European
Conmission. The European Council elects its President for a period of two and a half years,
renewable once. The President cannot at the same time hold a national office. 6 The current
incumbent is Herman Van Rompuy. a former Prime Minister of Belgium. 5 ' The tasks of the
European Council President include preparing and chairing the meetings, facilitating cohesion
and consensus, ensuring continuity. driving forw ard the European Council's work, and
representing the EU at his level (for instance in meetings with the President of the United
5
States) on issues concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 8
While it is foreseen that the European Council meets at least twice every six months
in Brussels, it has been gathering more frequently in recent years to deal with the crisis in the
Euro Area.
2 See Devuyst, supra note 3 and accompafnying text.

Alberta M. Sbragia, The European Comnnun:
TEU art. 10(2).

A BalancingAct, 23 PUBLIUS, no. 1, 23, 27 (1993). See aLso

54 TEU art 15(2). It must be noted thatthe name "European Council" cannot be abbreviated tothe "Council"

since the latter is a different EU institution. See TEU art. 13(1). For a general introduction to the European
Council, see generally PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW. TEXT, CASES, AN D MATERIALS 47-49

(5th ed. 2011); KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 474-484 (Robert Bray & Nathan
Cambien eds.,
3d ed. 201 );NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 161178 (7th ed. 2010); Philippe de Schoutheete, The European Council. in THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION at 43-67 (John Peterson & Michael Shackleton eds.,
3d ed. 2012).
55TEU art. 15(5).

16,
TEU art. 15(6).

17For the profile, speeches and agenda of the European Council President, see The President, EUROPEAN
COUNCIL, http:i/xNkAw.european-council.europa.eu/the-president'lang-en (last visited Feb. 17, 2013).
5STEU art. 15(6).
5 TEU art. 15(3). See also European Council, Conclusions, available at, http:www.europeancouncil.europa.euLcouncil-meetings/conclusions lang-en (last visited Feb 17, 2013) (The Conclusions page of
the European Council website provides material on European Council meetings and their conclusions).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol12/iss2/13

10

Devuyst: European Union Law and Practice in the Negotiation and Conclusion
NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

2. Decision-making
As a general rule, the European Council takes its decisions by consensus. 0 This
concept is not defined in the EU Treaties, but it must be understood that the European Council
has a "decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member,
present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed
decision.",,' This implies that each Head of State or Government has a defacto veto-right.J
European Council meetings are prepared by the Council of Ministers in its General Affairs
configuration, i.e.
by the meeting of the Ministers of European or Foreign Affairs of all EU
3
Member States.6
3. European Council Responsiblities in Trade Negotiations
The overall responsibility of the European Council is "to provide the Union with the
necessary impetus for its development" and to "define the general political directions and
priorities thereof.', 4 It does not exercise legislative functions and does not take formal action
in the conclusion of international agreements by the EU.65 With respect to the EU's external
action, the European Council identifies the strategic interests and objectives of the Union.
On September 16, 2010, it devoted a special session to this theme. 7 In its Conclusions, the
European Council explicitly referred to the importance of international trade policy:
The European Union's strategic partnerships with key players in the world
provide a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests
...In this context, enhancing trade with strategic partners constitutes a
crucial objective, contributing to economic recovery and job creation. We
must take concrete steps to secure ambitious Free Trade Agreements,
secure greater market access for European businesses and deepen
regulatory cooperation with major trade partners.
Similarly, when adopting the Compact for Growth, the European Council of June 28-29,
2012, underlined the contribution of international trade agreements:
Whilst strengthening the multilateral system remains a crucial objective,
the ongoing and potential upcoming bilateral negotiations have a
6'0TEU
61

art. 15(4).
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX(1) n.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867

U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144. See also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 161(7)(e), Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (providing the first
formal definition of the concept "consensus" in public
international law).
62 Devuyst, supra note 3,at 275-276.
63 TEU art. 16(6).
64 TEU art. 15(1).
65 id.
66 TEU art. 22(1).
67 European Council, Conclusions, supra note 10.
61 Id.para. 4.
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particularly high economic importance. More efforts should in particular
be geared to the removal of trade barriers, better market access,
appropriate investment conditions, the protection of intellectual property
and the opening up of public procurement markets. Agreements which
have been finalised must be rapidly signed and ratified. The Free Trade
Agreements with Singapore and Canada should be finalised by the end of
the year, negotiations with India need a new impulse from both sides, and
work should continue towards the deepening of the EU's trade relationship
with Japan. Heads of State or Government look forw ard to the
recommendations of the EU-US High Level Working Group on Jobs and
Growth and commit to working towards the goal of launching in 2013 of
negotiations on a comprehensive transatlantic trade and investment
agreement.69
The statements above are significant because they indicate that the European Council has, in
recent years, been taking an active interest in trade policy developments. v It has not,
however, been an active player in the politics of brokering concrete deals at the end of
important international trade negotiations: that would go beyond its mandate of defining the
EU's strategic policy directions. v For instance, it was the Council of Foreign Affairs
Ministers rather than the European Council that dealt with the EU's internal bargaining
process and the external policy setting during the conclusion of the Uruguay Round creating
the World Trade Organization. v2 In comparison with topics such as the modification of the
EU's Treaties, the EU's budgetary perspectives, macroeconomic coordination, and financial
crisis management, external relations in general are seldom discussed in detail by the Heads
of State or Government.

" European Council, Conclusions, Brussels (Jun. 29, 2012 EUCO 76/12), Annex: Compact tor Growth and
Jobs, {13(m).
70See also European Council, Conclusions, Brussels (Oct. 18-19, 2012 EUCO 156/12), 1 2(k); European
Council, Conclusions, Brussels (Feb. 7-8, 2013 EUCO 3/13), I]1-8 (for similar statements).
71 The failure of many scholarly works, both recent and older, to reference the European Council as an
important actor in trade policy is striking particularly in works analysing the impact of the European Council
Conclusions on various areas of EU law and policy. See generali, e.g.,
FREDERIC EGGER-MONT, THE
CHANGNG ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL IN THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEW\ORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(2012); JAN WERTS, THE EUROPEAN' COUNCIL (1992).

72 See generallr Youi Devtuyst, The European Commuuniy and the Conchlsion of the Uuguqr Round. in TlHEg
STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. VOL.3:BUILDING A EUROPEAN POLITY? 449-467 (Carolyn Rhodes & Sonia

Mazey eds.,
1995).
7- See generally Youri Devtuyst, The European Council and the CFSP ajter the Lisbon Treaty, 17 EUR.FOR.

AFF. REV.327 (2012).
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B.

The European Commission
1. Composition and Organization

The European Commission is the EU's permanent executive. It is in charge of
promoting the general interest of the Union, which is different from the interests of particular
Member States. The College of Commissioners is composed of one national of each
Member State.76 The Commission's term in office is five years, but members may be
reappointed for subsequent terms. 77 While Commissioners are in fact designated by the
Governments of their Member State, they may neither seek nor take instructions from any
Government or other entity once appointed. 7' In carrying out their responsibilities, the
Commissioners act in complete independence.7 The College of Commissioners is responsible
before the European Parliamento At the start of its term, the College is - as a body - subject
to a vote of consent by the Parliament.' In the course of its term, the Commission can be
forced to resign collectively following the adoption of a motion of censure by Parliament.s
One of the members of the College of Commissioners is specifically in charge of the
trade portfolio. It is one of the Commission's most significant political assignments. In the
College that serves from 2010 to 2014, the Trade Commissioner is Karel De Gucht, a former
Belgian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Member of the
European Parliament and Professor in EU law at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 5 The Trade
Commissioner works under the leadership of the Commission President and has the political
responsibility for the preparation and implementation of the EU's trade policy."' He acts as
the Commission's spokesperson on international trade questions at Ministerial level
conferences, in the EU Council of Ministers and at the European Parliament. 1 A small private

74For a general introduction to the European Commission, see CRAIG & DE
LENAFRTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 505-522; NUGEN

BURCA, supra note 54, at 32-40;
s'upra note 54, at 105-138; John Peterson, The

College of Commissioners, inTHE INS FITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 54, at 71-94.

7'TEU art. 17(1).
7'TEU arts.
17(4)-(5).
7 TEU art. 17(3).
79 td

TEU art. 17(8).
!TEUart. 17(7).
TEU art. 17(8).
The Members of the Barroso Commission (2010-2014), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http:iiec.europa.eu

/commission 2010-2014/index en.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (for the current composition of the College
of Conmissioners).
14 Jose Manuel Barroso, Mission Letter to Commissioner-designateKarel De Gucht (Brussels, Nov. 27, 2009),

available at http:itrade.ec.europa.eu/doclibidocs,2010/feb-uarvitradoc 145787.pdf. See general,

PETER

MANDELSON, THE THIRD MAN.LIFE AT THE HEART" OF NFW LABOUR 393-395 (2010) (for the testimony of

someone who held the post of EU Trade Conmissioner).
15About the CoE:i--ioe, Biogrw
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http:/iec.europa.eu/commission 20102014idegucht/abouticv (last visited June 12, 2013).
86 Barroso, supra note 84.
87About

the

Commissioner, Conmissioners

Agenda.

EUROPEAN

COMMISSION,

http:i/ec.europa.eu

/conmission 2010-2014/deguchtidiary (last
visited June 12, 2013) (for the Trade Commissioner's agenda).
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office (or Cabinet), consisting of nine officials with policy assignments, assists the
Connnissioner in the preparation of the weekly meetings of the College of Conmmissioners, in
preparing the Conunissioner's meetings and other engagements, and in relations with the
Connnission's Directorate General (DG) for Trade. 88
DG Trade is one of the Commission's 33 functional departments. 89 Other DGs
include, for example. Agriculture and Rural Development. Competition, Environment, and
Internal Market. 9° DG Trade works tinder the political authority of the Trade Conmnussioner.91
It consists of eight Directorates that cover the various functional and geographic
responsibilities of the Conunission in the trade field. In 2012, it counted 518 officials, of
which 322 were
in a role of operational policy official such as trade negotiator or antidumping
93
investigator.
2.

Decision-making

The College generally takes its decisions by consensus, on a proposal
of the
. 94
Commissioner who holds special responsibility for the file in question.
While the
Commission can legally act by a majority of its members, the two Colleges under the
Presidency of Jos6 Manuel Barroso, the former Prime Minister of Portugal, have refrained
from doing so. 95
3.

Commission Responsibilities in Trade Negotiations

The Commission has several crucial responsibilities in the functioning of the EU in
general and the CCP in particular. 6 They include the following:
0
Within the EU, the Commission has the exclusive right to propose legislative acts
defining the framework for implementing the CCP, to be adopted by the European

About the Corinnssioner; Team. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http:/ec.europa.euI/conmnissioi 20102014/deguchtiabout/team (last visited June 12, 2013) (for the composition of Conmissioner De Gucht's
Cabinet).
" About the European Commission, Departments, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http:ec.europa.eu//about
/ds en.lm (last visited June 12,, 2013) (for an overview of the Commission's departments and other services).
90 d.
91 Barroso, supra note 84, at 2.
92 About
the
Commissioner,

EUROPEAN

COMMISSION,

http:Hec.eu-ropa.eu/trade/tiade-policy-and-

you/contacts/people/index en.htm (last visited June 12,, 2013) (for the structure of the Conmission's DG
Trade).
93 Distribution of active officials and temporary agents by directorate general and gender (all budgets),
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http:Hec.europa.eu/civil serviceidocs/er-opa sp2 bs cat-sexe x dg en.pdf (last

visited June 12, 2013) (for the number of officials in the various Commission departments).
94 NUGENT, supra note 54, at 119-120 (for a good explanation of the Commission's internal decision-making
practice).
" TFEU art. 250; Michael Shackleton, The College of" Commissioners. in THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, suapa note 54, at 112.
96 See TEU art. 17(1) (declaring that the Commission is responsible tor overseeing the application of European

Union law). See also TFEU art. 207(3) (declaring that the Commission is responsible tor making
reconmendations to the Council in case of negotiations with third countries or international organisations and

that the Commission is to lead such negotiations and report their progress).
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*

*

"

"

C.

Parliament and the Council of Ministers in accordance with the ordinary legislative
procedure.
Before the EU can engage in the negotiation of international agreements with third
countries or international organizations in CCP matters, the Conunission must take
the initiative of making recommendations requesting the authorization of the
Council of Ministers to open negotiations,9'
The Commission ensures the EU's external representation, for example at the WTO,
and conducts international negotiations on CCP matters following the authorization
of the Council of Ministers; 99
The Commission manages the application and implementation of the EU's trade
policy instruments such as the EU's anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, safeguard and trade
barriers legislation; °0
As the guardian of the EU Treaties, the Commission oversees the application of EU
law by the Member States, also in the field of the CCP. 10 1 This includes the
possibility of bringing Member States before the Court of Justice for failure to fulfill
an obligation under EU law. 102 Since international agreements concluded by the EU
are binding on the Member States, the Conmission could bring a Member State
before the 0 3Court for an infringement of the provisions of an international
1
agreement.

The Council of Ministers
I.

Coniposition and Organization

Together with the European Council, the Council of Ministers represents the
interests of the Member States in EU decision-making. 10 4 It consists of a representative of
each Member State at ministerial level (and in contrast with the European Council. not at the
level of Heads of State or Government),. with the authority to conmult the Government of that
Member State and cast its vote. 10 5 Although it is legally one institution, in practice, the
17See TEU ari. 17(2); TFEU aris. 207(2), 294(2).
TFEU art. 207(3).
See TEU arts. 207(2), 207(4), 17(l) and TFEU art. 207(3). The Commission's external representation duty is
with exception of CFSP matters. In CFSP questions, the EU is represented by the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also a Vice-President of the Commission and Chair of the
Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers. See TEU ars. 18, 27. (on the role of the High Representative).
...
See TEU art. 17(1). For information on the Commission's role in the implementation of this legislation, see
Trade Defence, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http:!ec.europa.ei nade/ tackling-unfair-tade/trade-defence/ (last
visited Jone 12, 2013) and Trade Barriers,EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http:/iec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfairtrade/trade-baiers/ (last visited June 12, 2013).
...
See TEU art. 17().
0 TFEU ari. 258.
113 See TFEU ari. 216(2) ("Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union
and on its Member States.").
'0' For a general introduction to the Council of Ministers, see CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 54, at 41-46;
LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 484-504, NUGENT, supra note 54, at 139-160; Fiona HavesRenshaw, The Council oj Ministers. in THE LNSTTtUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 54, at 68-95.

'05 TEU ar. 16(2).
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Council (as
,. the106Council of Ministers is formally called) appears in ten different functional
configurations. One of these is the Foreign Affairs Council, composed of the Ministers for
Foreign Affairs of the EU's Member States and chaired on a permanent basis by the EU's
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 107 The monthly meeting of the
Foreign Affairs Council is responsible for treating international trade items. 10' However, the
Foreign Affairs Ministers traditionally prefer to focus on urgent questions related to the CFSP
and hardly devote any time on trade topics. " 9 In the second half of 2010, to improve the
ministerial treatment of trade policy issues, the Commission requested the revival of the
specific "Trade" formation of the Council.110 Since that moment, the Foreign Affairs Council
has effectively met at least once, and sometimes twice, per semester in the specific
composition of the Ministers for Trade, with a full agenda devoted only to trade policy
questions."' As provided for in the Council's Rules of Procedure, Council meetings of Trade

"' TEU art. 16(6). See also Council Decision 2010/594/EU, 2010 O.J. (L 263) 12 (amending two points of the
list of configurations of the European Council). See also Council Decision 2009/878/EU, 2009 O.J. (L 315) 46
(establishing a list of configurations that amend Art. 16(6) of the Treaty on European Union by ten areas of
responsibility).
117 See TEU arts. 16(6), 18(3).
108 Foreig
Af airs, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, http:iiwww.consilium.eir-opa.e/ policies/councilconfigurationsitforeign-aftaiis?lang en (last visited June 12, 2013).
'0 Sec. e.g., Press Release of the 3183'd Council Meeting Foreign Affairs, Council of the EU (Jul. 23, 2012)
(discussing mainly the political situations in Syria, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Mali and a conmmon security and
defence
policy),
'ilble (t
http:www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms Data/docsipressdata/EN
/foraff7131990.pdf, Press Release of the 3179" Council Meeting Foreign Affairs, Council of the EU (Jn. 25,
2012) (discussing mainly the political situation in Syria, Egypt, Iran and adopting a strategic framework for
human rights and democracy), cvaible at http:/i'www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms Data/docs/pressdata
/EN/foraff/131188.pdf.
Frank Hoffineister, The Europea, Unions Common Commercial Policj a Year after Lisbon- Sea Change
Vi
or Busines as Usual", in THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS A YEAR AFTER LISBON 83, 93

(Panos Koutrakos ed., 2011).
"' See Press Release of the 3031 ' Council Meeting Foreign Affairs, Council of the EU (Sept. 10, 2010)
(discussing trade relations with China and Malaysia and discussing the development of an EU policy on
international investments); Press Release of the 3 08 6 " Council Meeting Foreign Affairs Trade, Council of the
EU (May 13, 2011) (discussing bilateral investment treaties, trade-related aspects of the EU-Japan Summit and
the Doha Development Agenda negotiations); Press Release of the 3112th Council Meeting Foreign Affairs
Trade, Council of the EU (Sept. 26, 2011) (discussing its conmitment to success in the Doha round of world
trade negotiations, prospects for the conclusions of negotiations on free trade agreements with India and
Ukraine, Russia's accession to the WTO and strengthening trade relations with the counies of Southern
Mediterranean); Press Release of the 313 6 " Council Meeting Foreign Affairs Trade, Council of the EU (Dec.
14, 2011) (discussing its preparation for the 8th ministerial conference of the WTO, approving the accession of
Russia and Samoa to the VVTO, discussion bilateral negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia to
establish free trade areas, discussing giving preferential treatment to service suppliers of least-developed
countries); Press Release of the 3154th Council Meeting Foreign Affairs Trade, Council of the EU (Mar. 16,
2012) (discussing the EU's generalised scheme of tariff preferences for developing countries, discussing free
trade agreements with Colombia and Peru); Press Release of the 3 1 70" Council Meeting Foreign Affairs
Trade, Council of the EU (May 31, 2012) (discussing the free trade agreements with Colombia and Peru, free
trade negotiations with Vietnam, regulations for bilateral investment treaties of the EU, possible fiee trade
agreement with Japan, an EU-US working group on growth and jobs and trade liberalizations in the "green"
sector).
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Ministers are chaired by the Minister for Foreign Trade of the Member State
holding the six11
monthly rotating Council Presidency, and not by the High Representative. 2
The meetings of the various Council configurations are prepared by a system of
working groups, bringing officials and diplonmats from each of the Meiber States together
with Conmission officials.113 For trade policy questions, two important working parties must
be mentioned. First is the Trade Policy Committee. 114 The Committee has been active since
the early days of the European Economic Community (EEC) as the so-called 113 Committee,
referring to Article 113 EEC that was the basis for the CCP in the Treaty of Rome. 115 The
Council's guide to preparatory bodies describes the tasks of the Trade Policy Conuittee as
assisting and guiding the Conmission in the negotiation of trade agreements and advising it
on the CCP.116 In practice, there are two aspects to its deliberations. First is the element of
pernanent dialogue with the Conurission. While the Commission makes a systematic
presentation regarding each point on the Conurittee's agenda, the subsequent discussion
provides the Commission with a direct feedback fronm the Member States.11 Second, the
Contittee allows the Member States to have "extensive, frequent and in-depth discussions of
all trade matters," thus preparing decision-making on trade issues in the Council of
Ministers. 18 The Committee appears at three levels: the Full Members (the Director Generals
for Foreign Trade of the Member States) who are responsible for discussing the general
strategic aspects of EU trade policy, the Deputies (mid-level trade policy officials of the
Member States) who maintain a horizontal oveview of EU trade policy questions and deal indepth with trade in goods, and the Experts (in services and investment; mutual recognition,
and steel, textiles and other1 industrial
sectors). 119 The three Expert fornations report to the
20
Work.
their
Full Members on
The Committee meets three Fridays a month at Deputies level and one Friday a
month at Full Member level, which, in the words of insider Matthew Baldwin, "enables both

112Council Decision 2009/937EU, 2009 0J (L 325) 35, 38, In.I [hereinafter Council Rules of Procedure]

("When the Foreign Affairs Council is convened to discuss common commercial policy issues, its President
[i.e. the High Representative] will ask to be replaced by the six-monthly Presidency...")
See Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Delegations, Council of the EU,Annex 1, List of
Council Preparatory Bodies (Jul. 4,2012) (listing the different working groups on each topic).
1A See generally MICHAEL

JOHNSON, EUROPEAN COMMUNI[Y TRADE POLICY AND THE ARTICLE 113
COMMITTEE (1998) (providing an insider's perspective); Anna Murphy, in the M'aelstrom of Change: The
Article 113 Committee in the Governance of'ExAe nal Economic Policy, in COMMITTEE GOVERINANCE LN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 98, 107 (Thomas Christiansen & Emil Kirchner eds.,2000) (for a political
science
perspective).

"' See Note from the Presidency to the Permanent Representatives Committee (Pt. 2), Council of the EU,1]2
(Dec.1,2009) (renaming the 113 Committee to the Trade Policy Committee; See also TFEU art. 207(3); EEC
Treaty art. 113(3); TEC after Nice art. 133 (all declaring that negotiations with third countries should be

undertaken by the Commission in collaboration with a special conmittee appointed by the Council).
1

Note from the General Secretariat of the Council, supra note 113, at 3.
Murphy, supra note 114, at 106.
Hoffineister, supra note 110, at 93.
Note from the General Secretariat of the Council,, supra note 113, at 4. See also STEPHEN WOOLCOCK,

EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY, THE ROLE OF THE EU IN EXTER-NAL ECONOMIC RELAILONS 54,
(2012) (on the composition and functioning of the Committee).
121 See Note from the Presidency to the Permanent Representatives Committee (Pt. 2), Council of the EU,[ 2,
4 (Jan. 22, 2010) (modifying the working parties and committees participating in the Council's preparatory
work).
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discussion of the day-to-day details of ongoing negotiations, and a monthly strategic 'checkup. '

'1 1
2

The agenda of the meetings is available on the Council's website. 12 2 The minutes,

however, are only partially accessible to the public. 123 References to the substance of the EU's
negotiating directives, for instance, are systematically deleted from the public version. 121
The second relevant preparatory Council group is the Working Party on Trade
Questions, composed of the Trade Counselors in the Permanent Representations of the
various Member States to the EU. 125 In contrast with the Trade Policy Committee, the
Working Party does not deal with international negotiations, but with the preparation of the
EU's internal trade legislation and the follow-up of the EU's trade policy instruments such as
the anti-dumping regulation. 121 While the Working Party is not directly involved in
international negotiations, its wsork is often linked with such negotiations, since free trade
agreements usually
include safeguard clauses that need to get a legislative follow-up in
127
internal EU law.

Other Council preparatory groups deal with trade issues on a more specific or
topical basis. 12' They include the geographical Working Parties responsible for bilateral
relations with third countries (such as those on Transatlantic Relations, Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, Asia-Oceania, Latin America, and Africa) as well as the Working Parties on the
Generalized System of Preferences, Conmodities, Development Cooperation, Dual-Use
Goods, and Conventional Anus Exports and Arms Trade. 129
Council Working Parties generally report on their activities to the Conmittee of
Permanent Representatives (Coreper). 131 Coreper is composed of the Permanent
Representatives (Ambassadors) of the Member States to the EU. 131 It is in charge of making

Matthew Baldwin, EU Trade Politics
122 COUNCIL OF TH

-Heaven or Hell?,. 13 J.FUR. PUBL. POL'Y 926, 942 (2006).

Agendas of Meetings, available at http:!www.consilium.europa.eu
/documents/legislative-transparency/timetables-and-agendas/agendas-o3f-meetings (last visited June 12, 2013).
See, e.g., Council of the EU, Outcome of Proceedings of the Trade Policy Committee (Full Members)
Meeting on 13 July 2012, 12594/12 (July 17, 2012).
1 Id. at 3.
115Note from the General Secretariat of the Council, supra note 11 3 at 7.
"' Swedish Presidency of the EU, Working Party on Trade Questions (COMER), http:!register.consilium.
europa.eupdf/eni12ist13/st13O65.en12.pdf (last updated Dec. 30, 2009). For the agenda of the Working Party
on Trade Questions, see lttp:/register.consilium.europa.eu/servlet/driver?page-Result&lang-EN &ssf-DATE
DOCUMENT+DESC&fc REGAISEN&srm 25&md 400&typ Simple&cmsid 638&ff COTE DOCUME
NT=&ff TITRE=Working+Party-on+Trade+Questions&ff FT TEXT=&ff SOUS COTE MATIERE=&dd
DATE REUNION=&single comparator-&single date=&from date=&to date- .
The adoption of such regulations implementing a bilateral safeguard clause of a particular trade agreement
1_'
often takes many meetings. See Information Note, Council Secretariat to Working Party on Trade Questions,
9163/11 (April 14, 2011) (enumerating documents related to the regulation implementing the safeguard clause
of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement).
Note from the General Secretariat of the Council, supra note 11 3 at 7.
EUROPEAN UNION,

29 Id.

See TEU art. 16(7); TFEU art. 240(t); Council Rules of Procedure, supra note 112, art. 19(3).
In practice, Coreper appears in two Parts. Coreper Part II is composed of the Permanent Representatives
(and deals with the preparation of the high-politics Council configurations such as the Foreign Affairs Council).
Part I is composed of the Deputy Permanent Representatives (and deals with the preparation of the more
techmical Council configurations). See NUGENT, supra note 54, at 144; Jetfiey Lewis, National Interests: te
Committee ol Permanent Representtives, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 54, at

316. 322
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the final preparations for the work of the various configurations of the Council of Ministers,
and divides their agenda in A-items (on which a consensus has already been achieved in the
Working Parties or in Coreper)
and the B-items (on which further political discussion at
32
ministerial level is needed).
2.

Decision-making

As a general rule, the Council can take its decisions by a qualified majority, except
where the Treaties provide otherwise.133 Already in the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC,
it was foreseen that decision-making on CCP questions could take place by qualified majority5
voting. 34 This is also the principle under the CCP provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. I
Qualified majority voting functions as follows:' 36 Each Member State receives a number of
votes.137 The allocation of votes is not based on objective criteria, but is the result of a purely
political bargaining process that makes a rough distinction between the bigger, medium-sized,
and smaller Member States. 138 Under the currently applicable rules, the qualified majority in
the EU of 27 Member States is attained - and the decision is adopted - if three conditions are
met:
39
The qualified majority threshold of 255 out of 345 votes must be reached;>
*
*

*

At least a majority of the number of Member States must support the decision when
it is made on a proposal from the Commission (as is the case for decisions in the
CCP field);
At the request of any member of the Council, a check will be made to ensure that the
majority represents at least 62% of the EU population. 140

Qualified majority voting implies that one or more Member States may be put in the minority,
without the possibility of blocking the decision from being taken. 141 Once adopted, Member
States opposing the decision are nevertheless bound by it. 112 In practice, the Council will first

Council Rules of Procedure, supra note 112, arts. 3(6), 19(2).

33TEU art. 16(3).

134EEC Treaty art. 113.
TFEU arts. 207(2), (4).
36 See Devuyst, supra note 3, at 277-283 (for the history, rationale, and details on qualified majority voting
before and after the Lisbon Treaty).
137See Protocol (No. 36) On Transitional Provisions, 2010 O.J. (C 115) 322, art. 3(3) [hereinafter Protocol 36]
(detailing how the votes of member states are weighted).
Matthias Sutter, FairAllocation and Re-Weighting of Votes and Voting Power in the EU before and after
the Aext Enlargement, 12 J. THEORETICAL POL. 433, 448 (2000); Annick Laruelle & Mika Widgr6n, Is the
Allocation o" Voting PowerAiongEU States Fair?,94 PUB. CHOICE 317, 318 (1998).

'A voting calculator is available on the Council website. See CONSILIuM, http:/iwww.consilium.
europa.euicouncilivoting-calculator?lang en&cmsid 1690 (last visited June 12, 2013).
141See Protocol 36 art. 3(3). As indicated in TEU art. 16(4), the qualified majority system will change in a
fundamental manner as from Nov. 1, 2014. It will then require at least 55% of the members of the Council,
representing at least 65% of the EU population. See Devuyst, supra note 3, at 280-283 (for a more detailed
explanation).
14' This, of course, is the essence of any majority voting system.
142Once adopted, the legal instruments used in the CPP, i.e. regulations and international agreements, are
explicitly binding on all Member States. See TFEU art. 216(2).
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strive for consensus and only move towards a vote in case consensus proves impossible.
Between July 2009 and July 2012, only two Member States (the United Kingdom and
Denmark) have each once been placed in a minority position during a Council vote on an

international trade question. 141

In a limited number of specific cases related to the conclusion of international
agreements tinder the CCP, the Council is required to act by unanimity, meaning that the
agreement cannot be adopted if a Member State votes against. 14 5 This applies for the adoption
of:
(1) International agreements in the fields of trade in services, the commercial aspects of
intellectual property. and foreign direct investment that14include provisions for which
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules;

1

(2) International agreements on trade in cultural and audiovisual services that risk
prejudicing the EU's cultural and linguistic diversity; 147and
(3)

International agreements on trade in social, educational, and health services that risk
seriously disturbing the national organization of such services and prejudicing the
responsibility of the Member States to deliver them. 141

The first exception is not specific to the CCP but is valid for international agreements in all
EU domains. 149 It establishes a parallelism between the voting requirement on internal EU

legislation and international agreements regarding the same content. 15' The concrete impact
for the approval of international agreements in the CCP seems rather limited because most
internal market measures (which is the internal side of the CCP) can be adopted by qualified
majority voting.1 51 The second exception was a conditio sine qua non for France, supported

143See Jeffrey Lewis, Council of Ministers and European Council, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE

EUROPEAN UNION 321 at 322-324 (Erik Jones et al.
eds.,
2012); NUGENT, upra note 54, at 157 (both sources
emphasize the Council's general preference for consensus over qualified majority voting); Hoffmeister, supra
note 110, at 93; Stephen Woolcock, The Treaiy ofLisbon and the European Union as an Actor inlnternational
Trade, ECIPE WORKING PAPER 8 (ECTPE Working Paper No.01, 2010) (both sources underline the Council's
preference for consensus in the specific CCP area).
144Minority Trends on International

Trade, VOTEWATCH

EUROPE

(last visited

June

12,

2013),

http:Hwww.votewatch.eu/en/council-minority-votes-intemational-trade.html# #23/18/2009-07-14/2013-01 OINT.
141See TFEU art.
207(4); See also LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at494, for the definition of
unanimity in the EU. Abstentions do not prevent a decision from being adopted by unanimity.
146 TFEU art.
207(4).

...TFEU art. 207(4)(a).

14'TFEU art. 207(4)(b).

14'The parallelism between the unanimity requirement in TFEU art. 207(4), on the one hand, and TFEU,art.
218(8), on the other hand, is not complete, however, because the latter requires unanimity -when the agreement
covers a field for which unanimity is required tor the adoption of a Union act" (emphasis added). This could be
interpreted as requiing the coverage of a broad policy field. In TFEU, art. 207(4), unanimity applies "where
such agreements include provisions for which unaniinty is required for the adoption of internal rules"
(emphasis added). This could be interpreted as requiing unanimity, even in case of a minor provision, even
when the "centre of gravity" of an agreement is in another feld. See Ricardo Passos & Stephan Marquardt,
International Agreemens Competences, Procedures and Judicial Control. in GENESIS AND DESTINY OF THE
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 875, 904 (Giuliano Amato et al.eds.,
2007).

...Krajewski, supra note 49, at 306.
...Marco Bronckers, Common Commercial PolicY, in LISBON TREATY MEETLNG SuMMARIES, 46, 46 (Christa

Tobler ed., 2008).
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by Belgium. since they wanted to preserve their cultural and linguistic policies.1 52 The third
exception was a request of Sweden, Finland, and France,
to safeguard their national policies
15
concerning social, educational, and health services. 1
The Treaties provide no guidance on how it must be established that a particular

international trade agreement constitutes a risk prejuicing the EU's cultural and linguistic
diversity and/or a risk seriously distuirbing the national organization of social, educational and
health services and prejuicingthe responsibility of the Member States to deliver them. 151 It is
safe to say, however, that (a) the burden of proof is on the side of the Member State invoking
1
one of these exceptions; 55 and (b) the exceptions must be interpreted and applied strictly 156
On their impact for the conclusion of international trade agreements, opinions are divided. 157
Professor Marco Bronckers argued that their effect would be limited because the EU is simply
not expected to conclude agreements that would jeopardize the aforementioned public
services and policies. t58 Professor Markus Kxajewski. on the other hand, believes the Council
might well conclude all agreements involving the above-mentioned services by unanimity to
avoid interpretative uncertainties.1 59 Such an outcome would, however, not be in conformity
with the principle that exceptions must be applied strictly 160
Because the Council is formally a single institution, any of its ten configurations can
16 1
adopt decisions on all matters under the Council's competence. including on CCP issues.
As such, every Council meeting has, in addition to those items effectively debated by the
Ministers, a list of "other items" to be approved. 6 2 This refers to the so-called A-points on the
Council's agenda, i.e. issues that form the object of a consensus at the preparatory level of

During the European Convention resulting in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution forEurope,
amendments were submitted by French Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin, Proposition
d'amendement a Particle 111-212 [Proposed -Amendment to Article 111-212] (last visited June 12, 2013),
http:i/european-convention.eu.int/docsiTreaty/pdf 3/global3.pdf, Pierre Lequiller, the President of the
Committee for European Union Aftairs in the French National Assembly, Proposition d'amendement AI'article
111-212 [Proposed -Amendment to Article 111-212] (last visited June 12, 2013), http:/european0
convention.eu.intidocs/Treaty/pdf/866/Art 0 20111"/ 202120%2OLequiller%
20FR.pdf, and Belgian Minister of
Foreign Aftairs Louis Michel, Proposition d'amendement AParticle: 24 [Proposed Amendment to Article: 24]
(last visited June 12, 2013), http:i/european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/pdf/866/Art%2011I/ 020212
%20Michel%20FR.pdf, to safeguard the Member States' powers in these areas. See also Bulletin Quotidien
Europe, 13 (Feb. 11,2003) (on the French desire to safeguard its "cultural exception").
See Arne Niemann, The Common Commercial Poiy:- FronNice to Lisbon. in THE EU's LISBON TREATY.
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES AND LMPLEMENTATION 219 (Finn Laursen ed.,
2012).
151 See Krajewski, supra note 49, at 307 (emphasis added); Angelos Dimopoulos, TI Comm..o.i Commercial
Policy Qfter Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism betveen Internal and External Econom; ic Relations", 4

CROATIAN Y.B. EUR.L. & POL'Y 101, 125 (2008).
...Krajewski, supra note 49, at 307.
156 It is settled case law of the European Court of Justice that provisions that are in the nature of exceptions to a
principle must be interpreted strictly. See, e.g.,
Case T-529/09, Sophie in 'tVeld v.Council, 2012 E.C.R. IT0000, 1 18 [hereinafter Sophie in 'tVeld's Case].
117See infji
notes 158-159 and the accompanying text.
15' Bronckers, supra note 15 1,at 47.

159Krajewski, supra note 49, at 307-308.

See also Dimopoulos, supra note 154, at 125 (for a similar

interpretation).
1( See supra note 156 and the accompanying text.

16,1
Seegencrallb TEU arts. 13, 16.

...
See Council Rules of Procedure, supra note 112, art. 3(6).
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officials and diplomats and require no further discussion at ministerial level.163 For instance, it
was the Competitiveness Council and not the Foreign Affairs configuration that forinally
decided to repeal in light of Russia's admission to the WTO an earlier regulation, which
restricted imports of certain steel products from Russia. 16 4 A large number of Council
meetings in their different configurations regularly have anti-dumping decisions on their
agenda as A-points.16s
3.

Council Responsibilities in Trade Negotiations

The Council of Ministers is the key decision-taker in EU trade policy.66 This has
been the case since the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC in
1958. 167 According to the current EU Treaties, the Council's main trade policy tasks include:
*
Adopting - in co-decision with the European Parliament - regulations that contain
the legal framework for implementing the CCP;16 x
*
Authorizing the opening of negotiations for international agreements with third9
countries or international organizations and adopting the negotiating directives;'6
and
*
Adopting the decisions authorizing the signing of the agreement, its provisional
application, and its conclusion (or ratification) on behalf of the EU. 10
The Treaty stipulates that the CCP must be conducted in the context of the general principles
and objectives of the EU's external action.1 7 In this context, it is useful to point out that in
addition to its specific tasks under the CCP, the Council defines and implements the EU's
overall foreign policy on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines of the
European Council. 172 The Council of Ministers, together with the Commission, is also
responsible
for ensuring the consistency between the different areas of the EU's external
173
action.

163 Id.

'6' Press Release, Council of the EU, 3169th Council Meeting Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry,
Research and Space) 24 (May 30-31, 2012) (on file with the author), available at http:!www.consilium.europa
.eu!Newsroom.
6- .Seee.g, Press Release, Council of the EU, The 3182d Council Meeting Agriculture and Fisheries 19 (Jul.
16, 2012) (adopting an anti-dumping duty on imports of open mesh fabrics of glass fibers from Malaysia);
Press Release, Council of the EU, The 3181st Council meeting Economic and Financial Afftairs 20 (Jul. 10,
2012) (repealing anti-damping measures on imports of plastic bags originating in China and Thailand); Press
Release, Council of the EU, The 3180 t ' Council Meeting General Affairs 15 (Jun. 26, 2012) (amending a
regulation imposing an anti-duimping duty on imports of steel ropes and cables originating in China and Korea).
1' Hoftneister, supra note 110, at 93.
167See EEC Treaty arts. III 113.
'6' TFEU art. 207(2).
'6' TFEU art. 207(3).
17' TFEU arts. 218(5), (6).
17 TFEU arts. 205, 207(1).
17 TEU art. 26(2).
"3 TEU art. 21(3).
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D.

The European Parliament
1.

Coniposition and Organization

Since 1979, EU citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European
Parliament.174 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are elected for a term of five
years by direct universal suffrage. 175At this moment, Parliament counts 754 MEPs. 176 Most of
them are affiliated with one of the transnational European Political Groups that structure the
parliamentary debate.17 7 The largest Groups are the European Peoples Party (i.e. the European
Christian Democrats, with 271 MEPs), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
(189 MEPs), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (86 MEPs), the
Greens/European Free Alliance (59 MEPs), and the European Conservatives and Reformists
(52 MEPs).17 1 In Strasbourg, the MEPs attend twelve one-week plenary sittings per year. 179 In
Brussels, they participate in meetings of the parliamentary Committees and Political Groups,
and additional plenary sittings."'
Parliament's Committee on International Trade (1NTA) prepares the positions and
decisions on the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements for adoption in plenary
session." 1NTA has overall responsibility for matters relating to the establishment and
implementation of the Union's CCP and its external economic relations.
Reflecting the
makeup of Parliament as a whole, Committees are composed of a more limited number of
MEPs who specialize in a particular subject. 13 As such, JNTA has the possibility to enter into
in-depth discussions that would not be possible in plenary session. 18 With 31 members and
31 substitute members, JNTA is one of Parliament's smaller Committees.
During the
current parliamentary term, its Chair is Professor Vital Moreira, who is member of the
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats and former Judge of the Portuguese

174 See TEU art. 10(2). For a general introduction to the European Parliament, see CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra
note 54, at 51-57; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 452-473; NUGENT, supra note 54, at 179-206;
Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament,in THE INSTIfUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 54,
at 124-147.
5See TEU art. 14(3).
1 6 European
Parliament, MEPs By Member State and Political Group, http:/www.europarl.
europa.euimeps/enisearch.htmnl (last visited Mar 19, 2013).
177See TEU art. 10(4); European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, 7" parliamentary term, Mar. 2011, 2011 O.J.
(L 116) 1, [hereinafter EP Rules of Procedure], r. 30-34; NUGENT, supra note 54, at 193-198; Tapio Raunio,
PoliticalInterests: the European ParliamentsParty Groups, in THE INlSTIUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
supra note 54, at 338-358.

17' European Parliament, MEPs By Member State and Political Group, http:/www.europari.europa
.euimeps /en/search.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
10

I'd

...EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r.. 90, Annex V11 (111).
182 m.d

Id. r. 186.
EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r. 186; http:iiwww.europarl.ernopa.eu/committeesien/inta/diaftagendas. html#menuzone (or the draft agenda of the INTA meetings).
"' European Parliament, International Trade
Members, http:/Twww.europari.europa.eu/committees/en
/intaimembers html~menuzone (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
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Constitutional Court. 18 INTA holds monthly meetings, most of which take one day and a
half."' Meetings take place in public, with the exception of the in-camera briefings by the
Conmission on ongoing trade negotiations. 8
2. Decision-making
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament's consent is required
before the Council of Ministers is able to conclude international agreements covering CCP
issues. s9 Parliament's Rules of Procedure prescribe that - once an agreement reaches the
plenary and has been discussed on the basis of a report prepared in the responsible Committee
- consent is given in a single vote by a majority of the votes cast. 90 No amendments to the
text of the agreement are admissible.191
3. European ParliaientResponsibilities in Trade Negotiations
Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty,. Parliament's formal role in the
making of international trade agreements was nil. 192 Neither the EEC's founding Treaty of
Rome, nor the subsequent EU Treaties, prescribed the consultation of Parliament before the
conclusion of international agreements tinder the CCP. 19' A sea change occurred with the
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.1 9' The currently applicable legal situation is set out in
Article 207 TFEU (that is specifically devoted to the CCP) and must be read in conjunction
with Article 218 TFEU (that details the EU's wide-ranging procedures for the negotiation and
conclusion of international agreements in general).19 Together. these two Articles include
three important references on Parliament's role in the CCP:

.. European Parliament, Vital Moreira, http: /www.eu-oparl.europa.euimepsien/96930/Vital
17 See http:/iwww.europarl.europa.eu/committeesien/inta/diaft-agendas.html

MOREIRA.html.

menuzone (for the draft agenda

of the INTA meetings), supra note 184.
1

European

Parliament:

Connittees, TIE

COMMITTEE

ON

INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

NEWS

LETTER,

http:Hwww.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/inta/home.html.
9 See infra notes 198-205, and the accompanying text.
'9'EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r.90(7).
191 d

'9'EEC Treaty art.
113(3).
On the absence of Parliament in the formal process of concluding trade agreements before the Lisbon
Treat, see M. Quintin, Participation de l'Assenld:e parlementaire europrenne aiudcroulemzent de ia
"3

procedure de ngociation des accords cofllerciaux, 11 REVUE TRLMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 211
(1975); Marc Maresceau, The Concept "Common Commercial Policy "'and the Difficult Road to Maastricht. in
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER 1992: THE LEGAL DIMENSION 9

(Marc Maresceau

ed., 1993), Catherine Flaesch-Mougin, Le trait
,de Maastrichtet les competences externes de Io Corni2nautc
curopccnn. 29 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 383 (1993); Isabelle Bosse-Platiere, Le Parlement curopcen et
les relaionsexterieures de la Convnunaut europeenne apres le Trait6 de Aice, 38 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE
DROIT EUROPEEN 527 (2002).

194Bungenberg, supra note 49, at 129-130; CRAIG, supra note 9, at 390; EECKHOUT supra note 42, at 202-205;
Krajewski, supra note 49, at 308-309.
"9 TFEU art. 207(3) stipulates that where agreements with one or more third countries or international
organisations need to be negotiated and concluded that cover CCP matters, Article 218 shall apply, subject to
the special provisions of Article 207.
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"

"

The ordinary legislative procedure applies: Article 207(2) TFEU stipulates that
CCP legislation must be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative
procedure, thus guaranteeing Parliament's right of co-decision.1 16 This is in contrast
with the pre-Lisbon Treaty era, when
CCP legislation was adopted by the Council
197
without Parliament's involvement;
The consent procedure: Article 218(6)(a) TFEU makes Parliament's consent
obligatory for most important international agreements.198 Since the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty, consent is also required for agreements covering fields to
which the ordinary legislative procedure applies, thus including agreements under
the CCP. 199 As stated above, agreements subject to consent need Parliament's
approval (in the form of a simple "yes" or "no" vote) before the Council can take the
decision to conclude (or ratify) it. 20 Some scholars have argued that Parliament's
consent would be required only for those agreements under the CCP needing
implementation in EU internal law through the ordinary legislative procedure. 201
There is, however, no such requirement in the Lisbon Treaty. 2 ° 2 Parliament's
Committee on International Trade has correctly concluded that consent is mandatory
"as a general rule for all agreements concluded pursuant to the CCP, whether
implementing measures are required or not.,, 20 3 The Commission has confirmed this
reading. 2 04 This is a formal reversal of the Maastricht Treaty's provision explicitly
excluding agreements under the CCP, not only from the assent procedure. but also
from the non-binding consultation procedure.

'9' TFEU art. 207(2). The ordinary legislative procedure is defined in TFEU, art. 294. The bottom line of this
procedure is that an act must be adopted, on proposal of the European Commission, by the European
Parliament, and the Council of Ministers, i.e. Parliament and Council must agree on joint text that they both
approve.
117 See TEC after Nice art. 133(2).

'9' TFEU art. 218(6) stipulates that the Council shall adopt the decision concluding an international agreement
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament in the following cases: (i) association agreements; (ii)
agreement on Union accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms; (iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing
cooperation procedures; (iv) agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union; and (v)
agreements covering fields to which either the ordinary legislative procedure applies, or the special legislative
procedure where consent by the European Parliament is required. For other international agreements,
Parliament must simply be consulted before the conclusion. There is one exception: where agreements relate
exclusively to the CFSP, neither consent nor consultation is required.
TFEU art. 218(6)(a)(v).
EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r. 90(7), 90(9).
Krajewski, supra note 49, at 309-310.
TFEU art. 218(6)(a)(v). See also EECKHOUT, supra note 42, at 203-204; Dimopoulos, supra note 154, at
126-127.
203 Opinion of the Committee on InternationalTrade on the Treav oJ Lisbon [hereinafter INTA Opinion on
Lisbon Treaty], in European Parliament, Conmittee on Constitutional Affairs, Report by Richard Corbett &
lifigo Mendez de Vigo on the Treaty of Lisbon, Jan. 29, 2008, A6-0013/2008, at 84, 13(f).
201Hearing of Karel De Gucht, Commissioner-designate Trade, EUR. PARL. DOC. PV 112 1 (2010),
[hereinafter EP Hearing De Gucht], available it http:iwwweuroparl.europa.eu/RegData/commissions/inta
/proces verbali2010i01-12JiNTA P,(2010)01-12-1 EN.pdf
2o5TEC after Nice art. 300(3).
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The duty to inform Parliament: Article 218(10) TFEU holds that "the European
Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure for
the negotiation of international agreements." 206 For agreements under the CCP,
Article 207(3) TFEU reinforces this requirement by underlining that the
Cornmission shall report regularly to Parliament during the negotiations.. This
comes in addition to the Commission's duty to inform the Member States in the
framework of the Council's Trade Policy Committee. 2°8 Before the Lisbon Treaty,
Parliament was also informed on ongoing trade negotiations, but this was the result
of voluntary commitments by the Council and Conmission. 209 The Lisbon Treaty
for the first time makes the flow of information to Parliament an obligation
anchored in the EU's primary law.10
The Lisbon breakthrough can only be understood against the background of the European
Convention of 2002-2003 that prepared the failed Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe. 11 While previous EU Treaties were negotiated in secret, among diplomats and Heads
of State or Government, the Constitutional Treaty (the substance of which was later carried
over into the Lisbon Treaty) was prepared in an open Convention. 1 In addition to
representatives of the Heads of State or Government, it was composed of representatives of
the national parliaments, the European Parliament, and the European Commission, which
stimulated a real exchange of views on CCP reform. 13 In the Convention's Working Group
on the Union's legal personality,. a large majority of the members argued that the European
Parliament should no longer be denied a role in the approval of commercial agreements.
The Group prudently concluded in favor of extending the consultation procedure to
international agreements under the CCP.21 Within the Convention's Working Group on the
EU's external action, several members pleaded to go beyond consultation and in favor of
Parliament's consent on international trade agreements 16 In the subsequent stages of the

206

TFEU art. 218(I0).

207 TFEU

art. 207(3).

109On these commitments, see

1. MACLEOD, I.D. HENDRY & STEPHEN HYETT, THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF

98-100 (1996);Riccardo Passos, fixd Agreements from the Perspective of the
European Parliament,in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISIFED, supra note 45, at 273-277; Aline De Walsche, La
procddurede conclusion des accords inernationaux, in COMMENTAIRE J. MEGRET. LE DROIT DE LA CE ET DE
L'UNION EUROPtENNE. VOL. 12: RELATIONS EXTFRIEURES 98-106 (Jean-Victor Louis & Marianne Dony eds.,
2d ed. 2005).
o FEU arts. 207(3),218(10).
Youri Devuyst, The Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 163-166 (Erik Jones et al. eds., 2012) (for
a brief introduction). See also PETER NORMAN, THL
THE EUROPEAN COM1LNITIES

ACCIDENTAL CONSTITUTION. THE MAKING OF EUROPE'S CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY (2005);Guy MILTON &
JACQUES KELLER-NOELLET WITH AGNIESZKA BARTOL-SA REL, THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS,
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(2005) (for book-length accounts on the Convention).

Devuyst, supra note 211, at 163-164, 172.

Niemann, supra note 153, at 214-216.
Chairman of Working Group ILL
on Legal Personality, Final Rep. of Chairman ol"Working Group Ill on
Legal Personali6 to Members ofthe European Convention, CONV 305/02 1 45 (Oct. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
CONV 305/02].
I!d. 1'47 at 13.9.
6 Report from Working Group VII on "External Action" to Members of the European Convention, CONV
459/02, 1 61, 62 (Dec. 16, 2002).
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Convention, this demand became more pronounced. Prominent Convention members including its Vice-President Giuliano Amato, Elmar Brok (joined by many Convention
members of the European Peoples Party), Andrew Duff ljoined by many Liberal members),
and Linda McAvan and Helle Thorning-Schmidt joined by several Socialist members) 2
submitted amendments in this sense. The European Commission was on the same line.218
This resulted in Articles 111-315 and 111-325 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe, which, from a substantive point of view, are identical to the currently applicable
Articles 207 and 218 TFEU. 2 ' 9 The implementation of these new powers by the European
Parliament since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty will be discussed in Section IV
below.
E.

The Court of Justice of the European Union
I. Composition and Organization

The Court of Justice of the European Union, based in Luxembourg, is responsible
for ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the EU Treaties, the law is
observed.22 It has a three-layered structure. 1 The first and highest layer consists of the Court
of Justice in the strict sense. It is composed of one Judge from each Member State, but
conducts most of its work in chambers of three or five Judges. in exceptional cases, such as
Opinions on international agreements before their conclusion, it may decide to sit in a Grand
Chamber of 15 Judges or in full Cout.22 The Court is assisted by nine Advocates-General
who have the independent task of making reasoned submissions on the cases before them that

ProposedAmendments to the Text of the Articles of the Treaty Establishinga Constitutionfor Europe, Part
III of te Constitution, Chapter III Common Commercial Policy, THE EUROPEAN CONVENT[ON (last
updated
21

Jul. 28, 2003), http:/european-convention.eu.int/EN/amendments:amendments3dd9.html?content

-866&lan

g-EN, ProposedAmendments to the Text of theArticles of the Trea o ,Establishing a ConstitutionJor Europe,
Part III of the Constitution, Chapter 1 - InternationalAgreements THE EU ROPEAN CONVENTION (last updated

Jul. 28, 2003), http:i/european-convention.eu.int/EN/amendments/amendmentsec9fhtml ?content-872&lang
-EN.
'2'
Lamy,supra note 8,at 7.
219 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, arts. 11 (315), 11 (325), Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
142, 146.. This Treaty was signed by the Governments of all EU Member States, but failed to enter into force
because of the negative referendum results in France and the Netherlands.
2 TEU art. 19(1). For a general introduction to the Court of Justice of the EU,see CRAIG & DE BURCA, Supra
note 54, at 58-66; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 523-538; P.S.R.F. MATHIISN, A GLIDE TO
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 125-175 (10"' ed., 2010): NUGENT, supra note 54, at 214-225; Niamh Nic Shuibhne,
The Courtof Justice of the European Union, in THE INSTITU TIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNiON,supra note 54, at
148-172.
221 id.

222Id.: TFEU arts.
251-253.
2 TFEU art. 251; Protocol

No. 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union [hereinafter
Statute of the Court], 2010 O.J. (C 83) 210, art. 16;Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice [hereinafter
Court Rules of Procedure], 2012 O.J. (L 265) 1, aft. 28.
21 Statute of the Court, supra note 223, art. 16: Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 223, art.
27. See Opinion
1/08, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11129, supra note 44 (for an example of a Grand Chamber procedure); Opinion 1/03, 2006
ECR 1-01145 (for an example of a Full Court procedure).
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do not bind the Court. 22 5 In summary fornat. the Court of Justice has jurisdiction for: (a)
preliminary rulings on the interpretation or validity of EU law, following a request for such a
ruling by a national court or tribunal, (b) actions brought by an EU institution against an act
(or for failure to act) by the European Parliament, the Council, the Conulission, or the
European Central Bank, (c) actions brought by a Member State against an act (or for failure to
act) by the European Parliament and the Council (except Council acts of an executive nature.
i.e. measures in respect of State aid, dumping. and implementing powers), and against an act
(or for failure to act) by the Comnuission in case of enhanced cooperation, (d) appeal cases
against judgments of the General Court, and (e) Opinions on the compatibility
of envisioned
226
international agreements with the EU Treaties before their conclusion.
The second layer is called the General Court.227 It is composed of at least one Judge
per Member State and also conducts its work in chambers. 228 The General Court has
jurisdiction to hear and determine at first instance: (a) actions brought by natural and legal
persons against EU institutions. bodies, agencies and offices, and (b) actions brought by
Member States against all acts (or failures to act) by the Commission (with the exception of
acts related to enhanced cooperation), against Council acts (or failures to act) of an executive
nature, and against acts (or failures to act) by any other EU body, office, or agency.
Decisions given by the General Court are subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice
on points of law only. 230 The General Court also has
jurisdiction to hear and determine appeal
2
actions against decisions of the specialized coUrts. 31
The third layer consists of specialized courts that hear and determine at first instance
certain specific classes of action. 3 2 The first and only of such specialized Courts thus far the
European Union Civil Service Tribunal - was established in 2004 to deal with litigation
between the EU institutions and their officials. 213 It is obviously not involved in cases related
to the negotiation and conclusion of international trade agreements.
The Judges of the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal,
as well as the Advocates-General, are appointed by common accord of the Governments of
the Member States for a term of six years. 5 The two Courts and the Tribunal each elect a

22 Council Decision 2013/336, 2013 O.J. (L 179) 92, art. I (EU). The number of Advocates-GeneraI shall be
increased to eleven, with effect from October 2015.
2,26TFEU arts. 218(11), 256; Statute of the Court, supra note 223, art 51. See LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL,
supra note 54, at 533 (for a good sum nry).

227TEU art. 19(l); TFEU arts. 254, 256.
22' TEU art. 19(2); TFEU art. 254; Statute of the Court, supra note 223, art. 50.
22' TFEU art. 256(1); Statute of the Court, supra note 223, art. 51. See LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note
54, at 533; MATHUSEN, supra note 220, at 167-168 (for more comprehensive summaries).

230TFEU art. 256(1).

231TFEU art. 256(2).
= TEU art. 19(l); TFEU art. 257.
233Council Decision 2004/752, establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L
333) 7 (EC, Euratom); Statute of the Court, supra note 223, Annex 1.
234Sec Statute of the Court, supra note 223, Annex 1, art. 1.
23 TFEU arts. 253-255; Statute of the Court, supra note 223, Annex I, arts. 2-3 (Before the Member States
make the appointment, a specialised panel of seven former Judges, members of national supreme courts, and
high-level lawyers provides an opinion on candidates' suitability to perform the duties of Judge and AdvocateGeneral).
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President for a term of three years. who may be re-appointed. 236 Every three years, the
membership of both Courts is partially renewed. 3 Retiring Judges and Advocates-General
may be reappointed .3
2.

Decision-making

The procedure before the Court consists of two parts: written and oral. 239 The
written procedure involves the communication to the parties of applications, statements,
defenses, and of the replies .24 ) The oral procedure includes the hearing by the Court of agents,
advisers, lawyers, and experts.
The deliberations of the Court are in closed session. 24 2 In the drafting of a judgment,
the key role is performed by the Judge-Rapporteur who is designated by the President as soon
as an application initiating proceedings has been lodged. 4 Every Judge taking part in the
deliberations gets the opportunity to state his or her opinion and the reasons for it. 2 4 4 The
conclusions reached by the majority of the Judges after final discussion determine the
decision of the Court. 24 5 This may require voting.
The Statute emphasizes that the "deliberations of the Court of Justice shall be and
shall remain secret", implying that the position of the Judges taking part in the deliberations is
not made public.24 Judgments state the reasons on which they are based and contain the
names of the Judges who took part in the deliberations, but there is no possibility to publish
dissenting or separate opinions. 4 s
3.

Court of JusticeResponsibiities in Trade NVegotiations

With respect to international trade agreements, judicial review by the Court can be
either ex ante or ex post.249 Ex ante review takes the form of an Opinion from the Court of
Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the EU Treaties.. Any
Member State, the European Parliament, the Council, or the Commission can request such an
Opinion. Where the Opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged may not be

TFEU arts. 253-254; Statute of the Court, supra note 223, Annex 1,art. 4(1).
TFEU arts. 253-254.
LTFEU
arts. 253-254; Statute of the Court, supra note 223, Annex I, art. 2.
239Statute of the Court, supra note 223, art. 20; Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 223, arts. 53-92.
211Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 223, arts. 43-54.
211 Id. arts. 57-58.

Id. art. 32(1).
3

Id
4

art. 13.
e id. art. 32(3).

215See id. art. 32(4).
246 See id.

247 Statute of the Court, supra note 223, art. 35.

Id. art. 36.
4 CONV 305/02, supra note 214 1'44.

TFEU art. 218(11); LENAERTS & VAN
25 TFEU art. 218(11).

NUFFEL,

supranote 54, at 1038-1039.
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concluded unless it is brought in line with the EU Treaties.' ' Over the years, the Court has
been asked to deliver numerous Opinions on envisaged international agreements.5' The
Court's Rules of Procedure specify that a request for an Opinion may also relate to whether
the European Union or any institution of the European Union has the power to enter into that
agreement. 54 In practice, Opinions have, indeed, served mainly to clarify the division of
competences between the EU and its Member States in the conclusion of a specific
agreement.. The Court has rightly been criticized for failing to give the political actors
coherent legal guidance in such matters .2 As Professors Takis Tridimas and Piet Eeckhout
have correctly concluded, although the Court "has made broad statements of principle, it has
been singularly reluctant to draw from them what may seem to be their logical
consequences.
Judicial review ex ante, following the conclusion of an international agreement, can
either take the form of a preliminary ruling upon the request of a court or tribunal of a
Member State or of a review of itslegality. 25' A review of the legality of the act concluding
an international agreement can be brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the
Council, or the Commission "on grounds of lack of competence. infringement of an essential
procedural requirement. infringement of the Treaties or of any rle relating to their
application, or misuse of powers.", 259 The subject for such action will be the EU act that
sought to conclude the agreement, not the agreement itself 60 If the legality review leads the
Court to annul the EU act, for instance because it should have been adopted by the Council
and not merely by the Commission, the EU is not released from its international obligations
towards third parties. 261

-13 Cremona, supra note 42, at
219-26 (for a solid overview of the Court's case law on external competence, as
developed through a series of Opinions).
251Court Rules ot Procedure,supra note 223, art. 196(2).

25sCremona, supra note 42, at 219-26.
2,6 See PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW 85 (2006) ("[T]here is something deeply

troubling about the lack of clarity and consistency of the line of reasoning followed [by the Court in the
landmark case on implied external powers! ').See aso David L. Scannell, Trespassing on Sacred Ground: The
Irnplied External Competence of the European Co,unit, 4 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. L. STUD.343, 345 (2001)

("/T/he language employed by the Court... has not been conducive to legal certainty."). In the specific field of
the CCP, justified criticism of the Court has tcussed mainly on Opinion 1/94, [1994], E.C.R., 1-5267, that
concerned the scope of the CCP in light of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. See EECKHOUT, supra note 42, at27 34. See generally Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC inthe
WTO and Advisory Opinion 1.94: AntEc!ter,ac Procession, 32 COMMON MKT.L. REV. 763 (1995). See also
Meinhard Hillf The ECJs Opinion 1194 on the WTO -No Suprise, but Wise?, 6 EUR.J.INT'L L. 245 (1995);
Pierre Pescatore, Opinion 1/94 on "Conclusion " o[ the
TO Agreenent: Is There an Escape Jon a
Programmed Disaster", 36 COMMON MKT.L.RV.387 (1999).
25'Takis Tridimas & Piet Eeckhout, The External Cornpetence of the Community and the Case-Law of the
Court ol-Justice: Principle versus Pragnatisrn, 14 Y.B.EUR.L. 143, 172 (1994).
-1 See
c TFEU, arts.
267, 263; CONV 305/02, supra note 214 1'44; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54,

at 872-873
259TFEU art. 263.
26,CONV 305/02, supra note 214 1'42; LENAERTS & VAN NUEtEL,supra note 54, at873
2(,6See Case C-327/91 France v Comm n, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641, 11 14-16; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra
note 54, at 873.
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Before the Court, individuals can successfully invoke a provision of a specific
international agreement only if this provision has direct effect. 262 The Court will assess the
"wording and the purpose and nature of the agreement" and conclude on that basis whether
"the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its
implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure.,, 263 It must be noted
that the Court has excluded direct effect of the WTO Agreement. 264 It Will review the legality
of a Union act against the EU's obligations tinder the WTO only (a) where the EU intended to
implement a specific WTO rule; and (b) where the EU act expressly refers to a WTO
obligation.
IV. EU PRACTICE IN THE CONDUCT OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
The introduction to the EU's institutional framework in Section III presently allows
for a more in-depth discussion of the EU's conduct in the various stages of the making of an
international trade agreement.
A.

Requesting the Opening of Negotiations

In accordance with the Conmunity method, the European Conmission is formally
in charge of requesting authorization to start international trade negotiations. 66 When it wants
to initiate a negotiation. the Commission is obliged to address the necessary recommendations
to the Council of Ministers. 217 Without such Commission reconmendations, the Council is
unable to authorize the opening of negotiations. 68
Since the EU's political institutions are in regular contact about plans for future
trade agreements, requests to initiate negotiations do not come as a surprise to the Council .69
Furthermore, before submitting formal recommendations to open negotiations, the
Commission will hold a public consultation, conduct an impact assessment, and engage in an
informal exploratory dialogue with the third country concerned to identify areas where
interests might converge

... LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supranote 54, at 864; Marc Maresceau, BiateralAgreemnents concluded ky the
European Cornmunio. in 309 RECUEIL DES COURs 2004, 125, 262-267 (Hague Acad. of Int'l Law, 2006).
2 Scc63Case 12/86, Deairel v. Grnund, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, para. 14; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54,

at 864.
211See Case C-149/96, Portugalv. Council, 1999 E.C.R. 1-8395, [[. 34-52; CRAIG & DE

BURCA,

supra note

54, at 344-350; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 869-870; Maresceau, supra note 262, at 255-262.
2 See
c65
CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 54, at 346; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 870-871
266 TFEU, supranote 9, art. 207(3).
267 id.
268

id.

See European Commission, Factsheet: Trade Negotiations Step by Step 3 (Jue 2012) [hereinafter Trade
Negotiations Step by Step] availableathttp:,/trade.ec.europa.euidoclib/docsi2012/June/tradoc 149616.pdf
2 0 Id.; EECKHOUT, supra note 42, at 195; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 1027.
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B.

Authorizing the Start of Negotiations

The Council's responsibility to authorize the opening of the negotiations goes hand
in hand with its duties to establish negotiating directives and nominate the negotiator. 271
1. Establishing the NegotiatingDirectives
272
The Treaty stipulates that the "Council may address directives to the negotiator."
They set out the general objectives to be achieved and constitute the Commission's
substantive guidelines during the negotiations.
Negotiating directives are not legally
binding.274 In practice, the Commission presents draft directives to the Council when it
submits recommendations to start negotiations. 2 Following discussion in the Trade Policy
Committee, the Council may approve the directives as proposed or modify their content .276
According to Ambassador Hugo Paemen, the Commission's Chief Negotiator during the
Uruguay Round, obtaining negotiating directives that are representative of the common
interest is not always evident because the "uppermost concern" of the Member States "is to
look after their national interests, in the narrow sense of the term":

Inevitably, [Commission] proposals [for negotiating directives] intended to
reflect the collective position i.e. the Community interest are amended
to take account of disparate national views until, in many cases, all that is
left is the "lowest common denominator.
The European Parliament is not formally involved in the approval of the negotiating
directives. 2 8 As is clear from the opinion of Parliament's Committee on International Trade
on the Lisbon Treaty cited below, it considers this lack of formal parliamentary involvement
in the drafting of the negotiating directives as one of the Treaty's main shortcomings:
[INTA e]xpressly depreciates the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon does not
provide Parliament with the right to approve the mandate of the
Conmission to negotiate a trade agreement and stresses the imbalance
regarding the role and powers of Parliament 27 9between the internal and the
external competence in the areas of the CCP.

2' TFEU art. 218(2).
2 2 Id.art. 218(4).

2'3Trade Negotiations Step by Step, supra note 269, at 3;EECKHOUT, supra note 42, at 197; CRAIG & DE
BURCA, supra note 54, at333.
274Contra TFEU art.
288; EECKHOUT,supra note 42, at 197.
2'5EECKHOUT,supra note 42, at 197.
2 6 Id.;
VOOLCOCK, supra note 119, at54.
2 7 HUGO PAEMEN & ALEXANDRA BENSCH, FROM THE GATT TO THE WTO: THE EUROPEAN COMLNITY IN
THE URUGUAY RoUND 95 (1995).
279 EECKHOUT,supra note 42, at 199; WOOLCOCK,

supra note 119, at54.
21 INTA Opinion on Lisbon Treaty , supranote 203, T 5.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol12/iss2/13

32

Devuyst: European Union Law and Practice in the Negotiation and Conclusion
NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

Already in 1982, Parliament declared that it should have the formal right to deliver an opinion
on the negotiating directives. ° Should the Council not be prepared to bring the directives
into line with its opinion, Parliament envisaged the opening of a conciliation procedure.
During the European Convention of 2002-2003, the three main political groups (European
People's Party, Socialists and Liberals), as well as the Belgian national group, all submitted
amendments proposing a compulsory consultation of the European Parliament before the
Council would be able to authorize the start of negotiations.
Some Convention members
wanted to go beyond this and tabled an amendment whereby the Commission would negotiate
"within the framework of such directives as the Council and European Parliament may issue
2''s3
to it.
While these Convention proposals failed, Parliament used the negotiation of the
post-Lisbon Framework Agreement between Parliament and Commission of 2010 "as an
instrument for the incremental change of the living constitution with a view to ... enhancing
its role in international relations. ' 2s Parliament successfully inserted in the Framework
Agreement that "when the Commission proposes draft negotiating directives with a view to
their adoption by the Council, it shall at the same time present them to Parliament. , 2, 5
Furthermore, the Commission's information must "be provided to Parliament in sufficient
time for it to be able to express its point of view and for the Commission to be able to take
Parliament's views as far as possible into account. - 286 The Council reacted negatively to the
Framework Agreement's "parliamentarisation through the backdoor," declaring it had "the
effect of modifying the institutional balance set out in the Treaties in force." 8
Parliament reminded Commission and Council on several occasions that its views
have to be taken into consideration from the moment of deciding on the negotiating
directives. 2" For example, in its resolution of April 11, 2011, on the EU's international
investment policy, Commission and Member States were urged to take Parliament's position
fully into account before negotiations on future EU investment agreements would be
initiated. s Explicitly recalling the terms of the Framework Agreement, Parliament
'so See Resolution on the role of the European Parliament in the Negotiation and Ratification of Treaties of
Accession and of other Treaties and Agreements between the European Community and Third Countries, 1982
O.J. (C 66) 68,69, I1.A.111.
1 d.
-I- See Proposed Amendments to the Text of the -Articles of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
Chapter Fl supra note 217See also Proposed Amendments to the Text of the Articles of the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Chapter 111 supranote 217.

-Is European Convention on Suggestion for Amendment of -Article: 111-222, available at http:europeanconvention.eu.intidocs/treatyipdf 872 iArt. ;201110 .20222.
/20O oggenhuber"/20EN.pdf
2" Daniel Thyme, ParliamentaryITnvohl eent in European InternationalRelations, EU FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW: CONSTITU TIONAL FLUNDAMLNTALS 201, 206 (Marise Cremona & Bruno de Witte eds., 2008).

Framework Agreement, European Parliament
Framework Agreement 2010].

European Comm'n, 2010, O.J. (L 304) 61 [hcreiate

216 Id. at 50.
21 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Statement on Relations Between the European
Parliament and the Commission (Oct. 21, 2010). See also Andreas Maurer et al, InterinstitutionalAgreements
in CFSP: ParlamentarLsaion Through the Backdoor, 10 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 175 (2005).

211See Resolution on New Trade Policy for Europe Under the Europe 2020 Strategy, EUR. PARL. Doc. P7 TA
0412 (Sept. 27, 2011).
-19 Resolution on the Future European International Investment Policy, EUR. PARL. Doc. P7 TA 0141 (Apr. 6,
2011).
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sunuinoned "the Commission to consult Parliament on draft negotiating mandates in good
time to enable it to state its position, which must, in turn be properly taken into account by the
Conmission and the Council..
Parliament's rapporteur even held the view "that the
Conmlission should not submit its draft negotiating mandate to the Council until the EP has
adopted its resolution." 91
In a related move, Parliament inserted into its Rules of Procedure that it may ask the
Council not to authorize the opening of negotiations until it has stated its position on the
proposed negotiating mandate on the basis of a report from the Conmittee responsible. 292 It
applied this Rule on June 13, 2012, when adopting a resolution on the possible start of
negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with Japan. 9
Parliament's request to be involved in the determination of the negotiating directives
is the logical corollary of its right of consent. 294 While the Lisbon Treaty does not provide an
explicit basis for such an early involvement (that goes beyond merely receiving
information), 2 95 itisan omission that should be rectified during a future amendment to the
EU's primary law. 9
2. Nominating the Negotiator
The Treaty stipulates that the Council nominates the Union negotiator, depending on
the subject of the agreement envisaged . For negotiations in the field of the CCP, the Treaty
explicitly states that the Commission conducts international negotiations. 29s As a general rule,
the Commission also serves as the EU's negotiator in the other EU policy domains falling
within the Union's exclusive competence and in areas of supporting or shared competence to
the extend that the Union has exercised its competence internally. 299 This is important since
the EU's international negotiations with third countries often involve trade, in addition to
other topics under EU competence. 30 0 Exceptions are agreements relating "exclusively or
principally" to the CFSP (where the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy acts as the negotiator) and agreements concerning monetary or foreign
exchange regime matters (where the Council decides on the arrangements for the negotiation
29U id.
29'

Report on the Future European nteniational Ivestment Policy, EUR. PARL.DOc., A7-0070, 13 (2011).

EP Rules of Procedure,supra note 177, r.90(2).
See Resolution on EU Trade Negotiations with Japan, EUR.PARL.Doc.,B7-0297/2012 (June 13, 2012).
See supra notes 198-205 and the accompanying text.
See supra notes 276-277 and the accompanying text.
296 See infra notes 505-511 and the accompanying text (for a more elaborate
discussion on this point).
297 TFEU art 218(3).
29' TFEU art 207(3).
TEU,supra note 9, art 17(1) (the Commission "shall ensure the Union's external representation," with the
I99
exception of the CFSP); Council Decision authorizing the European Commission and the High Representative
of the Union for Foreign Aftairs and Security Policy to negotiate, on behalf of the European Union, the
provisions of a Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and
Canada, of the other part, that fall within the competence of the European Union, Brussels (Nov. 30, 2010)
16964/10 [hereinafter Council Decision Canada], art. 2 (for the limitation to exclusive competences as well as
supportive and shared competences that have been exercised internally).
292

Marc Maresceau, A I1poloD of'Mixed Bilateral Agreeinents. in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra

note 45, at 17-20; Maresceau, supra note 262, at314-422.
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and conclusion). 30 1 The Treaty also mentions the possibility of a "negotiating team," which
should logically be composed of both the Commission and the High Representative, i.e. the
two actors already mentioned in the same Article 218(3).3 Such a team must be envisaged
aspects of CFSP and other EU policies (and where
where a negotiation covers both significant
30 3
neither is purely ancillary to the other).
Where negotiations cover national competences, in addition to EU competences (the
so-called mixed agreements), the most efficient way forward would be for the Member States
304
to systematically ask the Conmmission to represent them also for their national competences.
Still, the Member States frequently prefer to charge the six-monthly Council Presidency with
this aspect of the negotiations3 °
C.

Conducting Negotiations
1.

The Commission as Megotimtor

In the field of the CCP, there is no doubt that it is the Commission conducting the
3 °6
In practice, it will designate a Chief Negotiator, usually
negotiations on behalf of the EU.
30 7
an official in its Directorate General for Trade. While DG Trade leads the negotiating team,
it will draw on expertise from other relevant DGs such as Agriculture and Health and
Consumer Protection. 30 A representative of the Council Presidency will generally accompany
the Commission when it negotiates on behalf of the Member States, for issues that fall within
their competences. 30 9 This is not the case, however, for pure trade policy questions, as they
310
are an exclusive EU competence.
The European Parliament is often eager to have a small delegation of MEPs
The Framework Agreement
participate as observers during international negotiations.

TFEU, supra note 9, art. 218(3), 219(3).
T

See Council Decision Canada, supra note 299.
303 TFEU, supra note 9, at 145.

304See, e.g., Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the
Council, authorizing the European Commission to negotiate, on behalf of the Member States, the provisions of
a Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Canada, of
the other part, that fall within the competences of the Member States Brussels, Nov. 30, 2010, 17037/10
classified, (but the text is available in document 16161/1/10 REV 1 EXT 1 partially declassified) [hereinafter
Canada Decision of the Representatives of the Governments], art. 1 (for an example of the Commission as
negotiator on behalf of the Member States).
,15 Hoffmeister, supra note 110, at 84. See also CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 54, at 335; Riccardo Gosalbo
Bono, The Organization of the External Relations of the European Union in the Treoat of"Lisbon, THE
EUROPEAN UNION's EXTERNAL RELATIONS A YEAR AFTER LISBON 31-32 (CLEER Working Papers) (Panos

Koutrakos ed., 2011); Sieglinde Gst6hl, EU hiltilatoralDiplomnacy after Lisbon: More Single European Voioe
in the United yotions?, in EUROPEAN UNION DIPLOMACY: COHERENCE UNITY, AND EFFECTIVENESS 143, 158

(Dieter Mahncke & Sieglinde Gst6hl eds., 2012) (for elaborate analyses of EU practice).
3" TFEU art. 207(3); EECKIOUT, supra note 42, at 197.
3 Trade Negotiatioos Step by Step, supra note 269, at 4.
See, e.g., Canada Decision of the Representatives of the Governments, supra note 304, art. 1A.

TFEU art. 3(l)(e)

3 Framework Agreement 2010, supra note 285, 'l 25.
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between Parliament and the Conmission makes clear that, where the Conmission represents
the EU in international conferences and multilateral bodies, it should, at Parliament's request,
facilitate such observation missions by MEPs. 112
2.

The Relationship between Commission and Council during the Negotiations

The Commission's conduct of the negotiations is subject to two legal constraints
relating to the Council. 3 3 First, the Commission is obliged to conduct the negotiations in
consultation with the Council's Trade Policy Committee. 3 4 As discussed in Section III.C.1,
the weekly meetings of the Trade Policy Committee provide the Member States with a regular
report on the progress of the negotiations, as explicitly foreseen in the Treaty. 3 15 In addition, a
practice of consultations on the spot has been established whereby the Commission provides
briefings to representatives from the Member States (often diplomats accredited3 6in the
country where the negotiations are taking place) before and after negotiating sessions.
Second, the Commission has the obligation to act within the framework of such
directives as the Council may issue to it. 3 17 The Council may adopt negotiating directives at
the time of launching the negotiations or at a later point in time; they may be updated and
supplemented at any time during the negotiations.
Thus, the Council authorized the
Commission to open the Doha Development Round negotiations during its session in Doha on
November 10-14, 2001, "in the framework of the directives which the Council will issue to
it". 3 19 These directives came in the format of successive Council conclusions on June 23,
2003, July 21, 2003, December 8, 2003, July 26, 2004 and October 11, 2004. 320 While some
of these directives referred back to earlier conclusions adopted in the framework of other
negotiations, they show 3 that the Council was actively following and trying to guide the
Conmission negotiators. 21
In political science, an abundant literature has developed regarding the
Conmission's degree of autonomy during international trade negotiations.
In essence,
political scientists tend to interpret the division of labor between the Council and the
Connmission in trade negotiations as an example of the so-called "principal-agent approach"
3i2 td.

313Council Legal Service, Opinion T 23 7389/05 JUR 104 (Mar. 17, 2005) ([hereinafter Council Legal Service
Note Doha].
3!4 TFEU art. 207(3). See also supra notes 114-124 and the accompanying text.
TFEU art. 207(3).
316 WVOOLCOCK, s upra note 119, at 57.
317TFEU art. 207(3).
3 Commission Services, Legal Issues Relating to the Negotiations within the Framework of the WTO's Doha
Development Agenda 4 SEC (2005) 566 final Apr. 26, 2005 [hereinafter Commission Services Working Paper
Doha].
3" Council Legal Service Note Doha, supra note 313, ] 19 (emphasis added).
320Id. T 24 (chronology until 2005).
,21

322 Scc Chad Damro, EU Delegation and Agency in International Trade Negotiations: A Cautionan
Comparison, 45 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 883 (2007); Bart Kerremans, Proactive Policy Entrepreneuror Risk
Minimizer? A Principal-AgentInterpretation of the EU Role in the ff 1O, in THL EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLES
IN INTER NATIONAL POLITICS 172-188 (Ole Elgstr6m & Michael Smith eds., 2006); THE EUROPEAN' UNION'S
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES: A PRINCIPAL-AGENT PERSPECTIVE (Andreas Diir & Manfi-ed Elsig eds., 2011).
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whereby the Council is considered as the "principal" who delegates powers to its "agent". the
Conmission. 323 The relationship between the agent and the principal, and the former's desire
for autonomy, is well illustrated in the memoirs of former EU Trade Commissioner Peter
Mandelson when he recalls his difficult relationship with President Nicolas Sarkozy during
the French Presidency of the Council in 2008.:32
Soon after I arrived [at the WTO] in Geneva for what we hoped would be
the breakthrough ministerial negotiations in July 2008, 1 was summoned to
Paris to clarify my position to President Sarkozy. This was very awkward.
At the time, France had just started its six-month rotating presidency of the
EU['s Council of Ministers], so Sarkozy was in one sense my boss. It was
right that I should, at the very least, inform him of what I was doing. But
as Trade Commissioner I had negotiating autonomy from the member
states, including France, and I did not want to compromise this
independence ...Most uncomfortably, I had to tell him that I would not
come to Paris if the aim was to bend my negotiating position at his will.
After discussions with Commission President Barroso and the equally
understanding Angela Merkel, I decided it would be best for me not to go
325
and see Sarkozy.
The tension between the Commission as agent and the Council as principal has also resulted
in legal controversies between the two institutions.326 One of the central questions has turned
around the argument of the Council Legal Service that prior explicit authorization from the
Council is needed before the Commission would be able to engage in partial "pre-legal
3 7
commitments" with third countries during the negotiations of an overall trade agreement. 2
The main reason for this position is that. where negotiations reach a stage in which parts of an
overall agreement are fixed
albeit in the form of not yet legally binding "pre-legal
conmitments" the Council would be deprived of any influence in the real decision-making
process if the Commission had full autonomy to make such commitments. 3 8
The Commission was right to reject this reasoning. 329 First, the Council's
interpretation would alter the EU's inter-institutional balance to the detriment of the
Commission's role as negotiator. 330 As has been underlined by the Court of Justice, with a
view of establishing a balance between the institutions, the Treaty "provides that agreements
between the [EU] and one or more States are to be negotiated by the Conmission and then

323

See supra note

322.

324Lorraine Mallinder, French President Takes on Mandelson, EUROPEAN VOICE, Mar. 3,2008, at 2,available
ithttp://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/french-president-takes-on-mandelson/61521
,21 MANDELSON, supra note 84, at 435-436.

.aspx.

,21 See, e.g., Council Legal Service Note Doha, supra note 313 (the exchange between Council and

Commission); Commission Services Working Paper Doha, supra note 318.
321Council Legal Service Note Doha, supra note 313

33; Commission Services Working Paper Doha, supra

note 318,at 2-3.
,21Commission Services Working Paper Doha, supra note 318, at3 (recalling the Council's position).
329 d. at 5.
33 Id. at 3-4.
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concluded by the Council". 331 The notion of a "pre-legal conmmitment" as invented by the
Council Legal Service is not contained in the EU Treaties. 332 Its introduction -with the
requirement for a formal Council approval of each commitment made by the Commission in
the course of a negotiation -would add a new procedural step into the EU's procedure of
making international agreements, which is not foreseen by the EU Treaties.333 It would shift
the inter-institutional balance in favor of the Council. 33
Second, the EU Treaties explicitly state that the Council must authorize both the
launching and the signing of international agreements.33 s All negotiating steps between the
launching of the negotiations and the signing of an agreement are logically the responsibility
of the Conimnission, which "shall conduct the negotiations", acting within the framework of
Council's negotiating directives and in consultation with the Trade Policy Committee. 336 If
the Council itself had to approve any significant "pre-legal commitment" in the course of the
negotiations.
the specific procedures of Articles 207(3) and 218 TFEU would become largely
337
redundant.
Third, the notion of "pre-legal contuitments", each to be formally endorsed by the
Council, "would be impossible to apply in practice". 33' As rightly underlined by the
Contuission, international negotiations "consist of a series of small steps which successively
reduce the number of outstanding controversial issues. Each negotiating session therefore
339
results necessarily in a number of 'pre-legal contuitments' or understandings
Nevertheless, "it does occur in practice that aspects that were provisionally accepted early in a
negotiation are subsequently modified". 34' As negotiations operate under the principle that
"nothing is agreed until everything is agreed", it would hardly be possible to draw the
borderline between the "pre-legal conitments" to be approved by the Council and others
that would not. 34 1 Furthermore, it would turn the EU into an impossible negotiating partner
that would constantly need run back to Brussels for formal approval of each step in the
negotiations.
3.

The Relationship between the Conunission and the European Parliament during the
Negotiations

The Commission is obliged to report regularly, not only to the Trade Policy
Contuittee, but also to the European Parliament on the progress of international trade
negotiations.
During the European Convention of 2002-2003, Irish MEP John Cushnahan
had proposed that the special coniuttee to be consulted by the Commission during the
33 Case C-327/91, supra note 261 28.
332Commission Services Working Paper Doha, supranote 318, at 3.
333

d

334 d. at 4.
335 md.

336 id.
337 id.

339

d

34 Id
341

312TFEU art. 207(3).
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negotiations would in the future be composed of an equal number of representatives of the
Council and the European Parliament." 3 The idea was unsuccessful. 4 1 In practice, the
inforniation exchanges with Parliament take place via its International Trade Conuittee
(INTA).3 45 In the Framework Agreement between Parliament and Commission of 2010, the
Coniussion's duty of infornation is specified in the following terms:
In the case of international agreements the conclusion of which requires
Parliament's consent, the Commission shall provide to Parliament during
the negotiation process all relevant information that it also provides to the
Council (or to the special committee appointed by the Council). This shall
include draft amendments to adopted negotiating directives, draft
negotiating texts, agreed articles, the agreed date for initialing the
agreement and the text of the agreement to be initialed. The Commission
shall also transmit to Parliament, as it does to the Council (or to the special
committee appointed by the Council), any relevant documents received
from third parties, subject to the originator's consent. The Commission
shall keep the responsible parliamentary committee informed about
developments in the negotiations and, in particular, explain how
Parliament's views have been taken into account .46
For example, during the negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
that started in June 2008 and were finalized in November 2010, the Commission shared with
Parliament seven successive draft texts of the agreement, three detailed written reports on the
negotiation rounds and fourteen notes and internal working papers. 347 Furthermore, the Trade
Commissioner and senior Commission officials informed Parliament in a series of meetings
about the ongoing negotiations during three plenary debates, six Committee meetings and
four informal debriefings of negotiating rounds. 318 Finally, the Contuission replied to 50
Parliamentary questions related to ACTA in 2010 and 2011.349
Such topical briefings and exchanges on specific negotiations. MEPs are
supplemented by moments of more horizontal information sharing. Twice a year, INTA holds
a structured dialogue with the EU Trade Commissioner, with the intention of contributing to
setting the Commission's key priorities in international trade matters, including on upcoming
trade negotiations.15 About four times a year, INTA also organizes in-camera briefings by

343
See Suggestion for amendment of Art. 33 by John Cushnahan, available at http:europeanconvention. e.int/docsiTreatv/pdt/872!Art33Cushnahan 0 20EN.pdf
34 TFEU arts. 207(3), 218(4).
,41See Framework Agreement 2010, supra note 285, 1 24. See also supra notes 181-188 and the
accompanying text (for an introduction to INTA).
346Framework Agreement 2010, supra note 285, Annex 111(5).
347Commission, Transparency of ACTA negotiations, Brussels (Feb. 13, 2012), 1-2.
348

d

49 d

Calculation by the author on the basis of the monthly INTA Newslettr that details the work achieved during
each INTA meeting.
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the Commission's Director General for Trade during which MEPs are informed on the state
of play of bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. 151
It nmust be noted that Conmission information on ongoing negotiations. when it is of
a classified nature, is accessible only by a limited number of designated MEPs, in accordance
with the detailed provisions on the treatment of confidential information that are annexed to
the Framework Agreement.152 Thus, in the case of the ACTA negotiations, the Conmission
shared classified documents only with the INTA Chair and Vice-Chairs, the INTA rapporteur
on ACTA, and the INTA coordinators of the political groups. 3 53
4.

The Relationship between the Council and the EuropeanParliament during the
Negotiations

What Parliament has insisted on receiving from the Council is access to the adopted
negotiating directives. 3 54 In a letter of December 3, 2010, the Chair of the Committee of
Permanent Representatives informed the Chair of Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs
that access to adopted negotiating directives would be possible only in a secure room on the
Council premises, whereby the documents themselves remained in the possession of the
Council
As in the case of the Commission, access was limited to the responsible
Committee Chair, the coordinators of the political groups and the relevant rapporteur. 356 The
fact that MEPs needed to go to the Council building to read the negotiating directives was
unacceptable for Parliament. 3 57 The Council, however, insisted that before any more flexible
consultation procedures could be put in place, Parliament needed to adopt internal rules for
the handling of classified documents, in line with Council's security requirements. 358 This
resulted, in 2011, in a Decision of Parliament's Bureau concerning the rules governing the
treatment of confidential information in the European Parliament. 359 That Decision, in turn,
opened the way for the adoption. in 2012, of "an Interinstitutional Agreement between
Parliament and the Council concerning the forw arding to and handling by the European
Parliament of classified information held by the Council (on matters other than those in the
area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy). ' ' 360 The Interinstitutional Agreement

Commission, supra note 347, at 1-2.
Framework Agreement 2010, supra note 285, T 24, Annex 11
353 Commission, supra note 347,
at 2.
35' Riccardo Passos, Te European Union's External Relations a Year after Lisbon: A First Evaluation from
the European Parli!en, in THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS A YEAR AFTER LISBON 49, 52-53
352

(Panos Koutrakos ed., 2011).
355

European Parliament Council, Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European
and the Council Concerning Access by the European Parliament to Sensitive Information of the
the Field of Security and Defense Policy, Annex, 2002 O.J. (C 298) 1 [hereinafter European
Council Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002] (Council applied rules from this
to oblige a consultation in a secure room on the Council's premises).

Parliament
Council in
Parliament
Agreement
scsee id.

357 Passos, supra note 354, at 52.
Id. at 52-53.

31

European Parliament, Decision of the Bureau of 6 June 2011 Concerning the Rules Governing the
Treatment of Confidential Information in the European Parliament, 2011 O.J. (C 190) 2.
3(0 Gerald Hdfner, Comm'n on Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament, Draft Report 2012/2069(ACI),
35'

Annex (June 5, 2012)
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applies explicitly to negotiating directives for international agreements. 36 1 It allows the
Council to forward the requested documents to Parliament where
they may be consulted by
32
the relevant security-cleared MEPs in a secure reading room. 1
5. The EuropeanParlianientand the Substance of the Negotiations
For the European Parliament, the Lisbon Treaty provisions on informing it at all
stages during an international negotiation only make sense if the MEPs use this information to
weigh on the substance of the process.363 In the words of MEP Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert:
The ratio legis of such a duty to inform is not to allow Parliament
passively to take note of the actions of the other institutions, but to afford it
the opportunity of bringing some influence to bear on the Commission and
the Council as regards the
content of the agreement. in order to facilitate its
364
consent on the final text.
To exercise an influence on important trade negotiations, INTA has developed a tradition of
drafting own initiative reports indicating its priorities well before the end of the
negotiations.- This is in accordance with Parliament's Rules of Procedure, which specify
that at any stage of the negotiations. Parliament may on the basis of a report from the
Contuittee responsible adopt reconmendations and require them to be taken into account
before the conclusion of the international agreement under consideration.16 1 On the substance,
Parliament's reports and resolutions are traditionally supportive of multilateral and bilateral
market opening initiatives, but also make a strong point of underlining that trade agreements
should help advance human rights and social and environmental standards by incorporating
binding clauses on these issues.36 An example is Parliament's resolution of March 24, 2011,
on relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council, which included the following paragraph:
[Parliament r]ecalls that, under the Lisbon Treaty, international trade
policy is one of the EU's foreign policy tools and that as such, for the
Union, respect for democratic principles and fundamental human rights,
together with the social and environmental dimensions, are absolutely
essential in all its international agreements; calls, therefore, for any future

Id art. 1(c).
3Se id.
arts.
4-6.
363Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament, Recommendation
(05305/I/2010REV C7-0004/2010 2009/0190(NLE) (Feb. 5,2010) (by Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert) 10
[hereinafter Report Hennis-Plasschaert].
64 d

36 Passos, supra note 45, at 285-286; Villalta Puig & AI-Haddab, supra note 49, at 299-300.
366EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r.90(4).
361See Resolution of 27 September 2011 supra note 288, [ .5-9; European Parliament, Resolution, Nov. 25,

2010 (2009/2219(INI)); INTA Opinion on Lisbon Treaty, supra note 203, 1.6 (for Parliament's principles
regarding the link between trade agreements and human rights, environmental and social protection clauses).
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free trade agreement to include an effective and enforceable human rights
clause.3 65
It should be noted that Parliament's repeated calls for binding clauses on human rights and
social and environmental protection in the EU's international trade agreements have not
remained dead letter. 36 9 For example, in the case of the Free Trade Agreement with Korea,
Parliament not only obtained the effective inclusion of labor and environmental standards in
Chapter 13, it also successfully insisted on a formal Commission commitment to monitor and
report on their implementation, with the help of an advisory group of representatives from
business, trade unions and civil society.
Similarly, Parliament's preoccupation for the
safeguarding of human rights, enhancing trade unionists' rights and protecting the
environment in the context of the Free Trade Agreement
with Colombia and Peru, also
37
prompted it to propose a concrete follow-up mechanism.
Initialing, Signing and Provisionally Applying International Trade Agreements

D.
I.

Initialing

Once the substantive negotiations are at their end and a text has been put on paper,
lawyers will review the draft in all its details.3 This can take from three to nine months. 3 3
Thereafter, the Chief Negotiators can initial the text.374 In EU practice, the decision to initial
trade agreements is the responsibility of the Commission, acting in consultation with the
Trade Policy Committee and INTA.375 The legal value of initialing is that it establishes the
text of the agreement as authentic and definitive.
2.

Determining the Legal Basis ofthe Agreement

Council decisions authorizing the signing and conclusion of international
agreements must mention the legal basis that allows the EU to act. 377 Commission and
Council agree that the EU's legal basis can only be determined between the initialing and the
signing of the international agreement, on the basis of the precise contents of the final text.378

36' European Parliament, Resolution on European Union Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Mar.
24 2011, 2012 O.J. (C247E) t, T 39.
3,6 See infia notes 370-372 and the accompanying text.
37' European Parliament, Resolution, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C323 E/521), 1 12; Conmittee on International
Trade, European Parliament, Report, Feb. 9, 2011, (0850 5/2010 C7-0320/2010 2010i0075(NLE) (by Robert
Sturdy) 10 European Parliament, Resolution, Feb. 17, 2011 2012 O.J. (C 188E) 94, Annex 1: Commission
Statement.
37 European Parliament, Resolution, June 13, 2012, 2012i2628(RSP, 1 22.
3 2 Trade Negotiations Step by Step, supranote 269, at 5.
3 3 Id.
3_" Id.; LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 1029.

,71 Commission Services Working Paper Doha, supra note 318 at 2.
376 Viena Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.LM. 679 (1968), art. 10.
377 Maresceau, supra note 262, at 154.

3

Commission Services Working Paper Doha, supra note 3 18 at 2.
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Strangely,. Parliament's Rules of Procedure stipulate that the Coninuttee responsible shall
ascertain and verify the chosen legal basis for an international agreement at the time when the
negotiations are scheduled to start.379 This rule should be changed and brought into
conforinity with legal practice.
The actual determination of the legal basis of an international agreement is a
complicated matter.3"0 In summar, format, the main principles established by the Court's
case law- are the following:
" The choice of the legal basis for a measure, such as a Council Decision to conclude
an international agreement. must rest on objective factors
amenable to judicial
381
review, which include the aim and content of that measure;
"

"

An EU act falls within the exclusive competence of the CCP only if it relates
specifically to international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote,
facilitate or govern 38trade
and has direct and immediate effects on trade in the
2
products concerned;
If examination of a measure reveals that it pursues two aims or that it has two
components and if one of those aims or components is identifiable as the main one,
whereas the other is merely incidental, the measure must be founded on a single
3 3
legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant aim or component S

"

With regard to a measure that simultaneously pursues a number of objectives, or that
has several components. which are inseparably linked without one being incidental
to the other, the Court has held that, where various provisions of the Treaty are
therefore applicable, such a measure will have to be founded, exceptionally, on the
various corresponding legal bases.3S4
" The Court initially held that recourse to a dual legal basis is not possible where the
procedures laid down for each legal basis are incompatible with each other.385 It
seems, however, that the Court has recently adopted a more flexible attitude and that
multiple legal bases, providing for different Council voting rules, can under certain
conditions be accepted, with the consequence that the more heavy unanimity
requirement prevails over qualified majority voting. 386
As underlined by Advocate General Juliane Kokott, the "choice of the correct legal basis is of
considerable practical and institutional, indeed constitutional importance. It determines not
only the legislative procedure applicable (rights of the Parliament to participate, unanimity or
qualified majority in the Council) but also whether the [EU]'s competence to legislate and
conclude an international agreement is exclusive or is to be shared with the Member

37'EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r.90(3), 37.
Sc Maresceau, supra note 262, at 154-185.
European Parliametnt v. Council of" the Europcan Union, 2008 (Court of Justice of the European
Communities); Opinion 2/00, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9713, up note 23, para. 5..
312Case C-347/03, Regione autonomna Friuli-Venezia Giulia and ERSA, v. finistero delle PoliticheAgricole e
Forestali,[2005] E.C.R. 1-03785, 1 75.
Case C-155/07, Parliametnt v.Council, [2008] 1-08103, 1'35; Opinion 2/00, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9713, supra note
23,para. 23.
3" Case C- 155/07, Parliamentv.Council, [2008] 1-08103, T 36; Opinion 2/00, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9713, supra note

23, para. 23.
385Id 1 37.
386

Id.T 69.
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States". 38 7 For specific and sectoral trade agreements that are clearly confined to the CCP, the
EU's exclusive competence is beyond any doubt.3 The situation is more complex for
broader trade agreements. such as the Free Trade Agreement with Korea, which not only
cover questions within the CCP sphere. but also other EU policy fields and even areas
covered by Member State competences. "3 Such mixed agreements (partly covering Member
State competences, in addition to EU 39
competences)
also need to be signed and concluded by
0
each of the Member States separately.
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU's primary law makes clear that the EU has the
exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement in one of the following
conditions: (a) when such an agreement concerns policy areas that are defined as EU
exclusive (internally), (b) when the conclusion of such an agreement is provided for in a
legislative act of the Lnion; (c) when the conclusion of international agreement is necessary
to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence; or (d) in so
far as the conclusion of an
3
agreement may affect the EU's common rules or alter their scope. 91
However, in many cases, the Treaties foresee in explicit external competences that
are not of an exclusive EU nature (and, thus, they do not automatically exclude a direct
involvement of the Member States in the conclusion of agreements covering those
competences). 392 Prominent examples frequently going together with trade agreements are
development cooperation that is a special parallel shared competence (whereby the exercise
of the EU's competence does not result in Member States being prevented from exercising
theirs, and whereby the Treaty specifies that international agreements between the EU and
third parties shall be without prejudice to the Member States' competence to negotiate and
conclude international agreements) and environmental protection (which is an ordinary shared
competence whereby EU action pre-empts the Member States from acting in the same area,
but whereby the Treaty also specifies that international agreements between the EU and third
parties shall be without prejudice to the Member States' competence to negotiate and
conclude international agreements).
In other areas where the EU's competence is shared with the Member States, the
primary law is silent about the external dimension. 394 This is, for example the case of social
policy which is an area often linked to trade agreements, especially since the European

317 Commission r. Council, 2005 (Opinion of Advocate General Kokott); Commission v. Parliamnct and
Council, 2005 (Opinion of Advocate General Kokott); Coinsionv. European Parliamentand Council ofthe
European Union, 2006, E.C.R.
Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Government of
the Russian Federation on Trade, OJ L 199/3 (2012); Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement in
the form of an Exchange and Letters between the Europear Union and the Argentine Republic pursuant to
Article XXIV:6 and Article NXXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 relating to
the modification of concessions in the schedules of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania in the course of their
accession to the European Union, OJ L 30/11 (2011).
Council Decision 2011/265/EU, supra note 13, ch. 1, at 8.
39'

See supra notes 44-47.

39' Council Notice on consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 2010/C (2010); see CIRAG,
supra note 9, at 163-167; EECKHOUT, supra note 42, at 112-113; LE NAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supranote 54, at
124-126 (for insightful comments).
39' Govaere, supra note 42, at 466-470; Cremona, supra note 42, at 251-253.

Council Notice on consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 2010/C (2010).
supra note 42, at 120-124.

394 EECKHOUT,
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Parliament is insisting on linking free trade to the protection of labor rights.39 To the degree
that the internal competence in these fields has not been exercised yet or leaves flexibility to
the Member States, international agreements are likely to need the involvement of the
Member States in the signing and ratification.3 ' 6 In this sense, it is most likely that the new
generation of free trade agreements that the EU is currently negotiating will, like the Free
Trade Agreement with Korea, be concluded as mixed agreements. 3 7
Furthermore, when trade agreements also cover the special area of the CFSP, they
risk being sucked into the "specific rules and procedures" governing this field, with a greatly
diminished role for the European Parliament, the Conmission and the Court of Justice.39 In
such a case, Parliament does not even need to be consulted before the conclusion.399 As
Professors Inge Govaere and Peter Van Elsuwege have shown, the Treaty of Lisbon has
unfortunately not facilitated the demarcation between CFSP and other EU policies such as the
CCP. 40 On the contrary, the new Article 40 TEU (modifying ex-Article 47 in the pre-Lisbon
Treaty TEU) implies that the institutions must not only see to it that the CFSP does not
encroach on other external competences. but also vice versa. 0 1 In addition, the High
Representative for the EU's Foreign Policy and Security Policy having one leg in the Council
(as Chair of the Foreign Affairs configuration) and one in the Commission (as Vice-President
for External Relations), there is a diminishing likelihood that the Conmission wsill stand tip
for the 2old Community acquis against Council's temptations to broaden the scope of the

CFSP.

40

As argued by Professor Govaere, it is Parliament that should be counted on to
"jealously guard its newly acquired decision-making role to all EU external action other than
CFSP" and act as the guardian of other external action when opposed to the CFSP as legal
basis. 0 3 This seems a realistic perspective. Already in its first opinion on the Treaty of
Lisbon, INTA underlined that there was a need of "ensur[ing] that the intergovernmental
logic of CFSP does not contaminate the CCP",.404 Parliament has, moreover, shown a concrete
willingness in defending its views on the legal basis of the EU's external relations actions
before the Court . In this context, it is interesting to note a judgment of the General Court of
May 4, 2012, in the case brought by Dutch Liberal MEP Sophia in't Veld to obtain access to
3'I
Id. at 152-153. See also notes 367-369 and the accompanying text.
396 Cremona, supranote 42, at 244-251 ; Opinion 2/91

1993] E.C.R. 1-01061, para. 21 (fbr the landmark case

in this respect).
Bungenberg, supra note 49, at 133; Villalta Puig & Al1-Haddab, supra note 49, at 298-299.
39' See TEL art. 24(2).
399 See TFEU art. 218(6).
...See Peter Van Elsuwege, EU Externial Acti after the Collapse of the PillarStructure: In Search o a NAew
,17

Balance Benveen Delimitation acnd Conistnc, 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 987, 987-1019 (2010).
411 See

TEL art. 40.

412 See idarts. 18(3), 18(4); Inge Govere, Multi-laceted Single Legal Personality and a Hidden Horizontal
Pillar:EU ExternalRelations Post-Lisbon, 13 CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LEGAL STUDIES 107-108
(2010-2011).
413 Inge Govaere, Multi-Jaceted Single Legal Personality and a Hiddcen Horizontal Pillar: EU External
Relations Post-Lisbon, 13 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR L. STUD. 107-108 (2010-2011); Peter-Christian M6ller-Graff,
The Common Commercial Policy Enhanced ky the Reform Treaty of Lisbon? in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU
EXTERN'AL RELATIONS 199 (Alan Dashw,ood & Marc Maresceau eds., 2008).
404 INTA Opinion on Lisbon Treaty, supra note 203, 1'9.
40

Govaere, supra note 402, at 107-109 (and cases referred to therein).
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an internal opinion of the Council's Legal Service regarding the legal basis of an international
agreement. 406 In light of the rules on public access to EU documents, the General Court held
that the Council could not deny access to the paragraphs of the Legal Service opinion dealing
with the choice of the legal basis.4 ° ' As this choice must rest on objective factors and does not
fall within the discretion of an institution, the Court stated that "the mere fear of disclosing a
disagreement within the institutions regarding the legal basis of a decision authorizing the
opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union is not a sufficient basis for
concluding that the protected public interest in the field of international relations may be
undennined".4 °8 On July 24, 2012, the Council decided to lodge an appeal against this
judgment. 40 9 In 't Veld's case is pertinent since Council cannot refuse Parliament access to of
(parts of) documents that would be available to the general public. If upheld by the Court of
Justice, the judgment of the General Court might result in a systematic request by Parliament
to be inforned on Council's internal considerations (including the opinion of its Legal
Service) when selecting the legal basis for an international agreement. This would only be to
the benefit of transparency.
3.

Signing and Provisionally Applying

On proposal of the Commission, it is for the Council of Ministers to decide whether
or not the EU will formally sign the agreement resulting from the negotiations. 4m1' According
to the traditional formula in such Council Decisions, the President of the Council is
authorized to designate the person(s) empowered to sign the Agreement on behalf of the
Union subject to its conclusion.4 ' While this is not spelled out in the primary law, it would
seem within the spirit of the Treaties for trade agreements - as well as other agreements
concluded under EU competences to be signed by a Commission representative on behalf of
the EU. 4 Agreements dealing primarily with the
CFSP should be the only exception to this
13
rule and be signed by the High Representative.
The signature indicates a political intention to move towards the agreement's
ratification, but it does not mean that the agreement's provisions are legally binding for the
signatory party.414 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signing

106

See Sophie in 't Veld's Case, supranote 156.
IId.

46-58, 123.

d.I

49-50.

411Case C-350/12 P, Council v. i

t

cld (case in progress).

410 TFEU art. 218(5).

41 Sec. e.g., Council Decision of 14 December 2011 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, and provisional
application of the Agreement between the European Union and the Government of the Russian Federation on
trade in parts and components of motor vehicles between the European Union and the Russian Federation 2012
OJ. (L 57) 14, art 2; Council Decision 2011 /265/EU, supra note 13, art. 2, at 2.
11 TEU art. 17(1); TFEU art. 207(3).
3 TEU art. 17(1), IS; TFEU art. 218(3).

"' See Vienna Convention art 12 (Unless the agreement provides that the consent of the parties to be bound is
expressed by the signature, in accordance with the Convention); EECKHOUT, Supra note 42, at 200-201;
LENAERTS & VAN,NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 1029.
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party is, however, obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the
agreement . 1
When deciding in favor of signing. the Council may also adopt a decision on the
agreement's provisional application before entry into force. 16 Such a provisional application
is particularly relevant with respect to bilateral mixed agreements that need the ratification of
all Member States, and thus require years before they can enter into force.' 17 Parliament's
Rules of Procedure specify that where the Conmission informs the Council of its intention to
propose the provisional application of an international agreement, it should simultaneously
notify Parliament."' Following a debate, Parliament may issue recommendations on the
matter.419
Since the decision on provisional application norlnally occurs at the moment of the
signing of the agreement
and thus before its formal ratification and Parliament's official
consent the issue is particularly sensitive to Parliament.i 20 On January 12, 2010, during
Parliament's hearing of Karel De Gucht as the Commissioner-designate for Trade, he was
asked to ensure that there would be no provisional application of the Free Trade Agreement
with Korea until Parliament had given its consent to it.421 De Gucht expressed his
understanding "that early application before the European Parliament has given its assent
causes a political problem". 4 2 In a subsequent debate on the same Agreement, he gave
Parliament the requested assurance:
[I am] not going to make a proposal for an early, provisional application
unless Parliament has itself pronounced on the agreement, whether as
formal ratification by Parliament or by some other procedure that we can
establish between the INTA Committee and the Commission ... in any
case, Parliament wsill have the opportunity to give its political judgment on
the agreement before any proposals for early application are put
forward .
Conmuissioner De Gucht's statement was interpreted as a major victory for Parliament. 424 In
technical terns, the solution was the following: The Council's Decision of September 16,
2010, on the signing and provisional application of the Agreement stipulated was formulated
so that the effective date of provisional application would be coordinated with the date of the
entr, into force of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council

TEU art. 18.
6 See TFEU art. 218(5); see also, e.g., supra note 409.
4 Seec7supra note 46 and the accompanying text.

41 EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r. 91.
4!9

d

121 See TFEU art. 218(5), (6).
12' EP Hearing De Gucht, supranote 204, at 7.
422 id. at 8.

42" Remarks ofMr. De Gucht, EuR. PARL. DEB. (19) 177 (Feb. 10, 2010).
424Sebastien Falletti, Trade: Parliament Put on an Equal Footing with Council, EUROPOLITICS, Dec. 3, 2010,
at 16.
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implementing the bilateral safeguard clause of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement. 42 Thus,
while the Agreement was signed on October 6, 2010, the provisional application entered into
force only on July 1, 2011, after Parliament's simultaneous vote on the Regulation
iiplementing the safeguard clause and consent.4 26 Parliament's success in the case of the Free

Trade Agreement with Korea has prompted it into making similar requests during other
negotiations. Thus, in its resolution of May 11, 2011. on the ongoing negotiations of the EUIndia Free Trade Agreement. Parliament again called on the Commission and the Council not27
to propose any provisional application of the agreement before the EP has given its consent.1
E.

Concluding Trade Agreements and Parliament's Consent Practice

Following the signature, the Council is in charge of adopting another decision
regarding the ratification of the agreement, which the EU Treaties confusingly call the
42
conclusion".
In some cases, the Council takes both decisions on the signing and the
conclusion at the same time .429 Through the ratification, the EU formally expresses its consent
to be bound by the agreement in question.4 30
Before the Council can conclude an agreement, the European Parliament must in
most cases provide its consent.
This is notably the case for international trade
agreements.4 32 The Treaty prescribes that the Council requests Parliament's consent after the
signing, but before the conclusion of the agreement
Parliament's Rules of Procedure,
however, provide that a draft agreement should be submitted for consent, when the
negotiations are completed, but before any agreement is signed. 434 Parliament's Rules should
be brought in line with the text of the Treaty. Before the vote on the consent is taken,
Parliament may seek an Opinion from the Court of Justice on the compatibility of an
421Council Decision 2011/265/EU, supra note 13, art.
3.2, at 11 .See generally Hoffreister,supra note 110, at
92-93 (on the politics behind this deal).
126European Parliament, Legislative Resolution of 17 February 2011 on the proposal tor a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council implementing the bilateral safeguard clause of the EU-Korea Free
Trade Agreement (COM(2010)0049 C7-0025/2010 2010/0032(COD)), 2012 O.J. (C 188E) 93; European
Parliament, Legislative resolution of 17 February 2011 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the
Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Korea, of the other part (08505/2010 C7-0320/2010 2010/0075(NLE)), 2012 O.J. (C 188E) 113.
127European Parliament, Resolution of 11 May 2011 on the state of play in the EU-India Free Trade
Agreement negotiations (P7 TA-PROV(2011)0224), 2012 0J (C 377 E!03), T 36.

42'TFEU art.
218(6).
42'EECKHOUT,supra note 42, at201. Council Decisions on the simultaneous signing and conclusion are often
taken tor agreements in the CFSP field. For examples, see Council Decision 201 L318/CFSP of 31 March 2011
on the signing and conclusion of the Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the
European Union on the participation of the United States of -America in European Union crisis management
operations, 2011 O.J. (L 143) 1;Council Decision 2011/640iCFSP of 12 July 2011 on the signing and
conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of
transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-led naval force to the
Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer, 2011 O.J. (L 254) 1.
Vienna Convention art. 14;TFEU art. 216(2).
V3

43 TFEU art.
218(6).
432 See supra notes 198-205 and the accompanying text.

433TFEU art.
218(6).
3 EP Rules of Procedure,supra note 177, r.5.
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international agreement with the Treaties. 3 5 In such a case, the vote on the consent is
adjourned until the Court has delivered its opinion. 36 It should be noted that in the case of
ACTA where the Commission had asked for a Court Opinion Parliament did not want to
wait with its vote until the Opinion was delivered.13 7 Parliament gives its consent in a single
"yes" or "no" vote by a majority of the votes cast. 438 If Parliament declines to consent to an
international agreement.
its President informs the Council that the agreement in question
39
cannot be concluded.d
The table below provides an overview of the consent resolutions on international
agreements adopted since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 4d0 After the transition
year of 2010, Parliament arrived at 50 consent resolutions in 2011 and 34 in 2012.4d1 Both in
2011 and 2012, trade policy was the domain with the highest number of international
agreements requiring consent.4 2 This included consent resolutions on high profile agreements
such as the Free Trade Agreement with Korea as well as a host of relatively technical and
sectoral agreements. 43
Table 1: Parliament's consent practice regarding international agreements after the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
Field of EU
2010
2011
2012
competence
Trade
Fisheries

2

Air traffic
Justice
home affairs
Other

18

20

5

3

11

1

&

7

7

3

EU

6

9

7

15

50

34

competences
Total

Source: calculation by the author on the basis of Parliament's texts adopted.
In the period before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament had
already made use of its more limited assent powers (which did not explicitly cover CCP
3 TFEU art. 21 8(1I); EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r. 6.
46 EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r. 6.
437 European Parliament, Legislative resolution of 4 July 2012 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion
of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, Australia,

Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the
Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America (12195/2011

C7-

0027/2012 2011/0167(NLE)) [hereinafter ACTA].
43' EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r. 7.
I d. r. 9.
140See European Parliament, Plenary Setting Search, http:!www.europarl.europa.eu/plenaiy/en/texts-

adopted.htmlaction 3&tabActif tabResult#sidesForm (for the listing of the relevant resolutions).

441Se e injia Table 1.
442

.

n
443See supra note
440.
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agreements) as a means to exercise pressure on the partner countries in specific human rights
matters. 414 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Parliament inmediately made clear
that it would use its new powers in full, even if it meant objecting to the result of several
years of negotiation.-4 On February 11, 2010, it decided not to give its consent to the
conclusion of the Agreement on the processing and transfer of financial messaging data from46
the EU to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program.1
Parliament feared the proposed text risked compromising European legal requirements for the
fair, proportionate and lawful processing of personal information.
Two years later, on July
4. 2012, Parliament
rejected ACTA, thus for the first time declining consent in the specific
. 418
49
CCP domain.
Once again, fundamental rights were at the core of Parliament's concerns.
It was of the opinion that ACTA's intended benefits were far outweighed by the potential
threats to civil liberties. °
In addition to its role as guardian of the EU's fundamental rights. Parliament has
also fulfilled the useful role of ensuring the legal purity of the Council's conclusion
decisions . 1 On June 4, 2012, INTA Chairman Vital Moreira addressed a letter on this
question to the Council's President-in-Office and the Trade Conmissioner. 14 2 He underlined
that "the scope of the Council decisions on the conclusion of international agreements should
be limited according to their objective and that "itis not legally or politically appropriate for a
Council Decision to include provisions that go beyond [such] objectives" ,.5 He emphasized
in particular "such Council Decisions cannot include provisions on the implementation of the
respective international agreements, which should be subject to a co-decided legislative
act" .454 In an interesting passage. underscoring the importance of this issue for the interinstitutional balance, Chairman Moreira wrote as follows:
By inserting such [implementing] provisions in the Council Decision
concluding an agreement, the Council would be circumventing the due
legislative procedure. depriving the Commission of its power of initiative
and depriving Parliament of its powers as the co-legislator. Under such
implementing provisions in a proposal for a Council Decisions, which

444See LENAERTS & VAN NUFFEL, supra note 54, at 1035. See. e.g. Passos, supra note 209, at280-281.
441See inja notes 446-450 and the accompanying text.
146 European Parliament, Resolution on the proposal fora Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement
between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking
Program (05305/1/2010 REV 1 C7-0004/2010 2009/0190(NLE)), 2010 O.J. (C 341E) 100 (Feb.11,2010).
147 Report Hennis-Plasschaert, supra note 363, at 8.
448ACTA, supra note 437.

449l .
45 Id.
450

411See infQ'notes 452-458.

45'Letter from Professor Vital Moreira, Chairman of the Committee on International Trade of the European
Parliament, to Ms Pia Olson Dyhr, Minister or Trade and Investment of Denmark and Mr Karel De Gucht,
Commissioner for Trade, Council doc. 12377/12, 3-4 (Jul. 10, 2012).
4I53d

at

4.

454 id.
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cannot be changed by Parliament. the powers of the Parliament as the colegislator are not respected.
In other words, INTA "insisted that the constitutional framework must be respected and the
inter-institutional balance maintained" 456 One month later, the Council effectively agreed to
submit revised requests for consent, with modified drafts of Council Decisions to
Parliament.4 57 In the modified drafts, implementing provisions were deleted and the Council
indicated its readiness to consider favorably their inclusion in a Regulation to be adopted
under the ordinary legislative procedure.45
As has been pointed out before, agreements concluded by the EU are binding upon
459
the Union's institutions and on the Member States.
In the EU's hierarchy of norms,
international agreements must be situated between the EU's primary law (the Treaties) and
the EU's secondary legislation.460 In the words of Judge Allan Rosas of the European Court of
Justice, this "is now a matter of settled case law: the Court has applied this view both to hold
that international agreements have primacy over acts of secondary law and to annul decisions
to conclude international agreements on the grounds that they violate primary law.
Council Decisions authorizing the signing and the conclusion of an agreement are both
published in the EU's Official Journal, together with the agreement in question.462 Following
the completion of the ratification process, the Official Journal will in most cases also publish
a notice indicating when an agreement has effectively entered into force .

455
456 id

417 Council of the Er. Union, Draft Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an

Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Russian Federation relating to the aninistration of
tariff-rate quotas applying to exports of wood from the Russian Federation to the European Union and the
Protocol between the Eur. Union and the Government of the Russian Federation on technical modalities
pursuant to that Agreement - Revised request by the Council for the consent of the European Parliament - Draft
letter to the Chairman of INTA, 12233/12 (Jul. 6, 2012), Council of the Eur. Union, Draft Council Decision on
the conclusion of the Trade Agreement between the Eur. Union and its Member States, of the one part, and
Colombia and Peru, of the other part - Revised request by the Council for the consent of the European
Parliament - Draft letter to the Chairman of INTA, 12234/12 (Jul. 6, 2012); Council of the Eur. Union, Proposal
for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement establishing an Association between the Eur. Union
and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other - Request by the Council for the
consent of the European Parliament - Draft letter to the INTA Chairman, 12242/12 (Jul. 6, 2012).
458See text accompanying note 457.
41' TFEU art. 216(2).
46' ALLAN RoSAS & LORNA ARtMAT, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48 (2010).
461 id.

412See

generalo, EUR-LEx, http:i/eurlex.europa.eu/Result.do?argO Agreement&argt Conclusion&arg2
&titre titre&chlang en&RechType RECH mot&Submit Search (Listing of the publication in the O.J. of
Council Decisions authorismg the conclusion of international agreements).
463See, e.g, infra note 468.
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE EU'S INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE IN THE CONDUCT
OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
A. The European Council's Ambitions in EU Trade Policy Formulation
The current institutional balance on the making of international trade agreements is
likely to be affected by the intention of the European Council to involve itself increasingly in
trade policy questions.46 4 Except for a few grand statements, the European Council (i.e. the
summits at the level of the Heads of State or Government) has been a rather absent player in
trade policy questions until now.465 European Council President Herman Van Rompuy wants
to change this.46' In September 2012, he publicly declared that he would "like to devote more
time to trade ... as a tool to help restore growth and create jobs in Europe'.46 In this context,
he underlined that "the European Council must continue to support ongoing and upcoming
4
FTA negotiations". 61
As long as the European Council limits itself to making broad strategic statements, it
remains within its role and can play a positive role in stimulating the EU's international trade
relations. It should not, however, venture into the concrete process of negotiating trade
agreements. The current dynamics of the EU's trade policy, working according to the
Community method, stands in sharp contrast with the European Council's intergovernmental
politics whereby the general interest is often lost in a bargaining process that focuses on
national interests. 469 The main shortcomings of the European Council's decision-making
process are the following:
(a) It lacks a common starting point for the discussions and, therefore, it requires a
considerable time to reconcile the various national viewpoints (in contrast with trade
policy debates in the Council of Ministers that take place on the basis of
Cornmission proposals);'70
(b) It is subject to veto-rights due to its consensus decision-taking (in contrast with the
qualified majority principle in the Council of Ministers); 471 and
(c) It often looks like a "tapestry market" (whereby Heads of State or Government link
and exchange compensations on unrelated issues) in a "decision-making culture"
close to that of "horse-trading". 2
464Herman Van Rompuy, Speech at the Annual Conference of EU Heads of Delegation (Sep. 5, 2012) in
EUCO 158/12 at 5.
461See supra notes 64-78 and the accompanying text.
466 Van Rompuy, supra note 464, at 5.
467 id.
468

id.

461 It is in this sense that Guy Verhofstadt, former Belgian Prime Minister and current leader of the Liberal
Group in the European Parliament, has labeled the European Council a "syndicate of national interests." See

Remarks of Guy Verhofstadt, EUR. PARL. DEB. (CRE 20100519) 7-8 (May 19, 2010), available at http:ii
www.europarl.europa.eui sidesigetDoc.do?type CRE&reference 20100519&secondRef TOC&la nguage en.
470 Devuyst, supra note 73, at 342-343.
471 Id. at 346.
1 2 FREDERIC EGGERMONT, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

N THE INSTITUTIONAL

FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS (2012).

See Remarks of Carl Haglund, EuR. PARL. DEB. (CRE 20101215) 19-20 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at
http:/,'www.europari europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do'?pubRef--
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In this sense, trade policy would be very badly served if it were to end up as a bargaining item
on the European Council table. As explained by the great European federalist Altiero
Spinelli, the essential tasks of the European Council should be giving policy directions and
developing cooperation in areas that go beyond the EU's present comipetences and ensuring
the transfer of new competences to the EU institutions whenever this is required. 4 3 As trade
policy has already been conferred to the EU as an exclusive competence, the involvement of
the European Council in this policy field unnecessary and might well undermine the existing
interplay between the institutions."' For example, in policy areas handled at European
Council level, the Council of Ministers has generally taken a step back, letting the Heads of
State or Government settle difficult questions. 1 Because of the reasons mentioned above,
this has not been to the benefit of the quality and speed of decision-making. 4 6 In other words,
the European Council should as much as possible stay out of the concrete trade policy-making
process.
B. The European Parliament's Growing Role in Trade Policy Formulation
1. Arguments against the Involvement of Parliament
A second major factor affecting the institutional balance is the growing role of the
European Parliament in the making of international trade agreements. 477 Some well-known
legal scholars have made highly skeptical remarks on the political and institutional
consequences of a further "parliamentarization" of the conduct of EU international agreement
making. 47' Because there is no automatic party-political support in the European Parliament
for the international actions of the Commission (as negotiator) and the Council (as shaper of
the negotiating directives), Professor Marc Maresceau expressed the fear that possible
parliamentary objections and delays risk endangering the much-needed credibility of the EU
in international relations.' He concluded that the "European Parliament should not become
,superman' in the conduct of external relations of the E[U]f"
Professor Joseph Weiler
added further arguments in the same vein:

i/EP/NONSGML+CRE+20101215+SIT+DOC+PDF+V0/iEN&language

EN. See

also

Remarks

of Carl

Haglund, EUR. PARL.DEB. (CRE 20101215) 18-19 (Apr. 5,2011), available athttp:/ www.europarl.europa.eui
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef--//EP /NON SGML-CRE20110405+SIT+DOC+PDF +V0/iEN&language-EN.
"3 ALTIERO SPINELLI, THE EUROPEAN ADVENTURE 169, 176-177(1972).
4 See TFEU art. 207. Article 207 does not provide tor a role of the European Council in the negotiation of

international trade agreements. See id. The institutional interplay provided for by Article 207 should not be
disrupted.
See Emmanuel Mouron-Druol, The Victori of the Intergove mental lethod? The Emergence of the
European Council in the Comrni

, ftitut ia Set-up (1974-1977), in THE ROAD EUROPE TRAVELLED

ALONG: THE EVOLUTION OF THE EEC/EU INSTITUTIONS A ND POLICIES 30-31 (Daniela Preda & Daniele

Pasquinucci eds.,
2010). See also MAURICE COUVE DE MURVTLLE, LE MONDE EN FACE 124 (1989).

4 6 Devuyst, supra note 73, at 345.
477See supra text
accompanying notes 192 -210..
478 Maresceau, supra note 262, at 228.
479 d
480 Jd.
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[Parliament's] involvement [in the negotiation and conclusion of
international agreements] may not necessarily contribute to the
effectiveness of the negotiations. It may further hem in the Contrission
... , produce delays and compromise negotiation tactics and overall
confidentiality. Its involvement may weaken the clarity of the Mandate of
which the Council is typically the author, further compromising the
effectiveness of the Contission qua negotiator having to answer two
masters ... 41
In addition, Professor Weiler underlined the institutional point that Parliament - as the
institution that needs to give its consent at the end of the negotiations - should not be
involved in the process of making the agreement:
[A]part from the negotiation effectiveness there is a deeper concern...
[namely] the need for the body that scrutinized not to be involved in the
matter that comes up for scrutiny. On the factory floor, the quality
controller should not be the same worker who assembled the component
. If Parliament were involved in the negotiations, would it not be all the
more difficult to engage in independent scrutiny which at least may be
argued is what the Treaty intended.
2.

The Constitutional Necessity of a Greater Role for Parliament in Trade Policy
Formulation

The concerns, as formulated by Professors Maresceau and Weiler, merit serious
consideration. As a starting point, it must be noted that the increasing involvement of the
European Parliament in the making of international agreements is not the result of a mere
coincidence of temporary political factors, but the logical reflection of the basic principle that
the functioning of the Union is founded on representative democracy, whereby the citizens
are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament.
In this context,
Parliament's involvement in the conclusion of agreements in the field of trade policy became
a necessity for three reasons. First, the Lisbon Treaty enlarged the scope of the CCP to the full
range of trade in services (except for transport), the commercial aspects of intellectual
property and foreign direct investment, in addition trade in goods.
Furthermore, the CCP
was confirmed as an exclusive EU competence. 485 As a result, national parliaments will no
longer be involved in the ratification of pure EU agreements in the enlarged CCP sphere.416

411 Joseph Weiler, Dispatch from the Euro Titanic: And the OrchestraPlayed On, EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 2, 2011)
http:Hwww ejiltalk.org/dispatch-from-the-er-o-titanic-and-te-orchestia-played-on-ejil-editorial/ (blog of the

Eropean Journal of International Law).
482 Id.

413TEU art. 10(l), (2).
48 See TFEU art. 207(l).

4 See id. art. 3(1)(e). See also Villalta Puig & Al-Haddab, supra note 49, at 300.
See generaiy TFEU Title 1 Only mixed agreements, involving competences of the Member States, are
subject to the ratification according to the national constitutional requirements, most often including the
approval of the national parliament.
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To ensure the democratic legitimacy of such agreements. the enhanced role of the European
Parliament became indispensable.
Second, the Lisbon Treaty extended the Council's possibility to decide by qualified
majority voting on CCP matters, with only limited exceptions. 187 This has decreased the veto
power of individual Member States in the Council and, indirectly, also decreased the ability
of national parliaments to steer the process of making and blocking international trade
agreements via their country's representatives in the Council."' This is one of the reasons
why many constitutional scholars have argued that qualified majority voting in the Council. if
it is not accompanied by the right of co-decision for the European Parliament, would lead "to
a structural gap of parliamentary control" .4
Third, the Lisbon Treaty made clear that the CCP like the other EU activities on
the international scene needs to be conducted in the context of the general principles and
objectives on the Union's external action.4 90 These include support for democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and the principles of international law, peace and conflict prevention,
sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, and
stronger multilateral cooperation.
In a democratic Union, the weighting of the various
policy objectives directing the CCP should be the subject of an open political debate, for
which the European Parliament is the appropriate forum. As EU Trade Conmissioner Karel
De Gucht stated during his confirmation hearing:
trade policy is, to be sure, an essential lever in our economic policy, but it
remains in the service of our society's wider objectives, such as respect for
social rights, good governance and the protection of the environment. It is
therefore by nature a political instrument, on which the voice - by
definition a political voice of Parliament must make itself heard more
clearly. 9

See TFEU art. 207(4).
4 8 See id During international negotiations, national parliaments can try to steer the process only via their
17

national governments. See id. To the degree that the national governments are no longer able to block a
negotiation upon the request of their national parliaments, the influence of the national parliaments is
diminished. See id.
411See Michael Nentwich & Gerda Falkner, The Treat q
oAinsterdam: Towards a New InstitutionalBalance,
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (Aug. 25, 1997), litip:/eiop.or.at
eiop/pdf/1997-O15.pdf See also
Adapting the Institutions
to Make a Success of Enargement: Contribution to Preparationsfor the InterGovernmental Conference on Institutional Issues, at 7,COM (1999) 592 final (Dec. 2, 1999) ("any extension of

the scope of qualified- majority voting must be combined with the co-decision procedure of the European
Parliament"); Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There isa Democratic Deficit inthe EU A Response to
A1aijone and 11oravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 544-545 (2006) ("Increasing the powers of the
European Parliament has certainly improved the legitimacy of policy outcomes in precisely those areas where
the indirect control of governments over outcomes has been weakened by the move to qualified majority voting
and the delegation of significant agenda-setting power to the Commission.").
490TFEU art.
205, 207(1).
49'TEU
192 EP

art.
21.

Hearing De Gucht, supra note 204, at 7.
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3. The Added Value ofParliament's IncreasingInvolvement in Trade Policy
Formulation:a Summary ot the Practice
The next question is whether the practical objections articulated by Professors
Maresceau and Weiler have overshadowed the possible added value of Parliament's
involvement in the making of trade agreements. This has not been the case. Parliament's
actions have contributed in a positive manner to the following legal and institutional
evolutions:
(a) A much greater attention to the consequences of international agreements for
fundamental rights and civil liberties, as well as on social and environmental
493
protection, with Parliament acting as an effective guardian in this respect;
(b) An increasing openness in the complex discussion on the legal basis of
international agreements (especially 494
if the Court of Justice confirms the in 't
Veidjudgment of the General Court);
(c)

A more careful use of the provisional application of important trade
agreements, involving some form of agreement from Parliament 495
(d) A greater scrutiny of the purity of Council decisions concluding agreements,
eliminating those elements that should be the subject of a proper legislative
procedure 49 and
(e) The creation of more systematic monitoring mechanisms to follow-up on the
operational effects of trade agreements .
In addition, it must be noted that Parliament has withheld consent in only two out of the 99
agreements that came before it between January 2010 and December 2012.498 Inboth cases,
the absence of consent was well motivated on grounds of the protection of fundamental rights
and civil liberties. 499 Because of Parliament's open debate practice, each of the elements
above will also enhance the transparency in the preparation, negotiation, conclusion and
implementation of EU trade agreements in general' .0 In this sense, Stephen Woolcock's
prediction. when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, that Parliament's increased powers
over the EU's trade policy would go "a considerable way to filling the democratic deficit that
previously existed" in this field seems to have been confirmed'. 1
4. The needfor Parliament's involvement in determining the EU's negotiating
directixes
As a logical corollary of the consent requirement, Parliament has insisted on being
involved in detennining the EU's negotiating directives. Professor Weiler's concern in this

413See supra text accompanying notes 367-369, 446-450.
494See supra text accompanying notes 403-409.
" See supra text
accompanying notes 410-427.
496See supra text
accompanying notes 451-458.
4 See
e7 supra text
accompanying notes 369-37 1.
498See supra text accompanying notes 440-450.
499 see

id.

...See EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r. 180-182.
50 'Woolcock, supra note 143, at14.
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context, that by co-opting itself into the negotiating game Parliament would weaken its
independent scrutiny ability, seems to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of
Parliament's role. 02 Unlike the Court of Justice or the Court of Auditors, Parliament is not an
independent judicial or control body charged with verifying respect for a specific number of
legal and procedural requirements. 03 It is a political institution composed of representatives
of the Union's citizens
who are organized in Political Party Groups to influence to course of
50 4
the EU's policy.
Professor Weiler is correct when he underlines that an increasing involvement of
Parliament in determining the negotiating directives might pose problems for the Commission
who would then be facing two masters (Council and Parliament). 505 However, the
Conmission is already in this position since Parliament must in any case give its consent to
the final outcome of the international trade negotiations. 50 By refusing consent to ACTA and
to the Agreement with the United States on the processing and transfer of financial messaging
data, Parliament has given the clear signal that its opinions. expressed at the start and in the
5 7
course of the negotiations. should be taken seriously to avoid a negative result at the end. 0
While the Lisbon Treaty does not provide an explicit basis for such an early involvement (that
goes beyond merely receiving information), it is an omission that should be rectified during a
future amendment to the EU's primary law. In the meantime, the institutions should take the
initiative and establish a standard inter-institutional procedure that allows Parliament to
systematically comment on draft negotiating directives. 5° ' Essential in this context is that such
a new inter-institutional arrangement fully includes the Council (contrary to what happened
when the Framework Agreement of 2010 was concluded). 5 09 The arrangement should
particularly define the procedure to be followed in case of conflicts between the positions of
Parliament and Council. 5 10 Already in 1982, Parliament had proposed to establish a
conciliation procedure in such cases. 11 Council and Commission both have a strong interest
in providing Parliament with a role at the moment of defining the EU's negotiating objectives

02 See Weiler, supra note 48 1, at 3.
03 Throughout the EU Treaties, consent is used as an instrument to obtain Parliament's political approval. It is

not seen as an instrument for ex-post independent control.

See, e.g., TEU art. 7(2) (breach by a Member State
of EU fundamental values); TEU art. 14 (composition Parliament); TEU art. 48(3) (not convening a
Convention tor Treaty revision); TEU art. 49 (admission of a new Member State); TEU art. 50 (withdrawal of a
Member State); TFEU art. 312(2) (adoption of the multiannual financial framework); TFEU art. 329(1)
(authorization of enhanced cooperation). See also TEU (comparing the strict requirement for independence in
the performance of the duties of the members of the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors, with the
political role description of the European Parliament); TEU art. 14 (Parliament); TEU art. 19 (Court of Jtstice);
TFEU arts. 223-234 (Parliament); TFEU arts. 251-281 (Court of Justice), TFEU arts. 285-287 (Court of
Auditors). See general ' TEU (for examples of the foreseen consent requirements).
114See TEU art. 14(2); See also TFEU art. 224; EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 177, r.30-34.
sos Weiler, supra note 481, at 3.
...TFEU art. 218(6).
MSee
07
supra notes 445-450 and accompanying text.
508 See Anne Pollet-Fort, Irnlpications of the Lisbon Treaw o,o

EU External Trade Policy, EU CENITRE IN

SINGAPORE BACKGROUND BRIEF 15 (2010/2).
SSee sara

notes 284-287 and the accompanying text.

So ee Pollet-Fort, supra note 508, at 15.
5I See supra notes 280-281 and the accompanying text.
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and in working out consensual arrangements for -joint action
512since neither of them is served by
blockages at the moment of the conclusion of agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the EU and its Member States are struggling to find an adequate answer to the
Euro Area crisis, there are no such signs of disarray in the making of the EU's international
trade policy. The CCP is an area of exclusive EU competence, where the Treaties have
established a functioning balance between the institutions defending the EU's general interest
(the Commission), representing the Member States (the Council of Ministers) and the citizens
(the European Parliament) and ensuring respect for the rule of law (the Court of Justice). The
successful interplay between these institutions - along the lines of the Community method has allowed the EU to become a major player in international trade diplomacy that is
currently pursuing an offensive policy of negotiating and concluding free trade agreements
with partner countries worldwide. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the main
change in the EU's trade formulation process has been the enhanced role of the European
Parliament. Rather than looking upon the European Parliament's active involvement in the
making of international trade agreements as a factor of uncertainty and instability, it should be
welcomed and further developed as indicated in the previous Section of this article.
Parliament has not only brought a much needed element of democratization and open political
debate in EU trade policy making, it has - in practice - delivered ample proof of its added
value, notably by reinforcing the preservation of fundamental rights during the negotiations.

See, e.g., Passos, supra note 354, at 51-52.
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